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1 
 
Introduction 
 
Looking back across Romania‟s twentieth century, Romanian philosopher Emil 
Cioran once said: "Some countries are blessed with a sort of grace: everything works for 
them, even their misfortunes and their catastrophes. There are others for whom nothing 
succeeds and whose very triumphs are but failures. When they try to assert themselves and 
take a step forward, some external fate intervenes to break their momentum and return them 
to their starting point."
1
 Interestingly enough, this particular concept of fate has always been 
part of socio-political discourse in Romania. Often times the focus shifted towards the 
benefits of a suprastate, mirrored by what is often called a Romanian inability for decision-
making. The idea of the impossibility for Romanians to make their own decisions and 
determine their own fate has, in fact, become a national cliché as of late. What many call the 
tragedy of the Romanian people in the twentieth century has more often than not been used 
either as a scapegoat or as a political tool.
2
  Without a doubt, the need for legitimization 
within a specific foreign political context has been crucial for Romanian governments. 
However, it is false to assume that external factors (League of Nations, Nazi Germany, 
Soviet Union or the European Community) have managed to dictate or have a decisive role 
when it comes to the framing of the minority policies in Romania.  
                                                        
1
 E.M. Cioran, "Petite Théorie du Destin" (from La Tentation d'Exister), Oeuvres, p. 850. The French original 
reads: "Il y a des pays qui jouissent d'une espèce de bénédiction, de grâce: tout leur réussit, même leurs 
malheurs, même leurs catastrophes; il y en a d'autres qui ne peuvent aboutir, et dont les triomphes équivalent à 
des échecs. Quand ils veulent s'affirmer, et qu'ils font un bond en avant, une fatalité extérieure intervient pour 
briser leur ressort et pour les ramener à leur point de départ." 
2
 Traian Basescu has been reelected as president in 2008, despite the poor economic and social performance.  
The campaign discourse often related to the relationship between the Social Democrats and Communists, as a 
large number of the old guard of the party was made of reformed communists. Opposition media often criticized 
Basescu for using elements of the past in his discourse and thus, taking away the focus from the precarious state 
of Romania in 2008. His re-election finally led to controversial comments, particularly from popular media 
figures (e.g. Mircea Badea), about the ability of the Romanian electorate to separate from its past and focus on 
the future. 
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The legitimate impetus for policies vis-à-vis ethnic minorities has come from within 
the state, whereas the external factor has been mostly reactionary to the historical context. 
Hence, this study will emphasize a series of internal elements that have had a fundamental 
role in the drafting of minority policies, shadowing the potential external pressure between 
1918 and 2007. For example, during the interwar period minority policies were a large part 
of the nation-building strategies, whereas political interests of the state leaders were crucial 
for the period between 1938 and 1989. Romania went through a long period of 
authoritarianism that started with King Carol II, continued with Marshal Ion Antonescu, 
followed by a communist period which reached its epitome during Nicolae Ceausescu‟s rule. 
Throughout these periods the minority policies were consequences of power centralization, 
but socio-economic benefits played an important part as well. In the post-1989 era there is a 
clear attention given to domestic legitimization
3
 particularly in the period between 1990 and 
1995. However, international legitimization
4
 that would lead for internal development 
became an important incentive for state reforms, which included a series of policies that 
targeted minorities.  
There has been much research on causes and effects of minority politics in Romania 
in the twentieth century. Unsurprisingly, the heavy focus has been on the post-1918 
Unification, the starting point of this thesis, when the Old Kingdom made of Moldova and 
Wallachia, unified with Transylvania, Bukovina and Bessarabia, ultimately gaining a large 
number of minorities. The arguments concerning the existence of direct pressure exercised 
by the League of Nations are scarce, largely due to its failure of implementing the Minority 
Treaties or the Wilsonian principle of “self-determination.” There is also a tendency to 
                                                        
3
 I define “domestic legitimization” the vote of trust given by the population of the country. 
4
 I define “international legitimization” the international recognition of the main powers in a specific time 
frame. 
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dismiss the process of assimilation that the Romanian governments imposed during the 
interwar period. This can be largely seen in reports of human rights organizations, which 
mention the fact that Romanian governments ignored the ethnic minorities. However, 
historian Irina Livezeanu, for example, in her book Cultural Politics in Greater Romania 
offers a particularly insightful perspective on the process of cultural assimilation during this 
period. Furthermore, Maria Bucur in Eugenists and Modernization in Interwar Period draws 
on the racial politics that emerged at the end of the 1930s, an element of important influence 
on the relationship between state and minorities. 
  Nevertheless, it seems that scholars have been more interested in the authoritarian 
regimes of Romania. Even so, the historiography on King Carol II has been relatively weak. 
Therefore, my analysis is largely centered on his published daily notes, which demonstrate an 
acute interest in centralization of power in the style of Hitler or Mussolini. However, his 
successor, Marshal Ion Antonescu, has been the object of intense analysis. Nonetheless, in 
his case, the politics behind historiography played an important role in the building of the 
“Antonescu controversy.” During the communist period, Romanian historiography on the 
Holocaust was extremely weak, leading post-communist analysts to conclude that this was a 
period of rehabilitation of Antonescu‟s image. In fact, the bulk of the analyses concerning 
Antonescu came after 1989, particularly after 1995. This was largely due to the fact that up 
until 1995 there was a sense of approval of Antonescu as a great patriot who was forced to 
preserve national unity and integrity. Historians Jean Ancel and Dennis Deletant offer a more 
objective perspective on Antonescu‟s rule. Their interpretations differ however: Ancel in his 
study Antonescu and the Jews emphasizes the internal impetuses for minority policies versus 
Hitler‟s pressure, whereas Deletant in Hitler’s Forgotten Ally focuses more on the 
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relationship between Hitler and Antonescu as an element of influence in the shaping of these 
policies. The debates centered on Antonescu‟s political figure beg for analyses of primary 
sources. Hence, in this study I will attempt to shed light on the real impetuses behind his 
minority policies by using monographs, letters, stenograms and reform points. 
The fascist period however has not been analyzed to the extent of the communist 
period. Social anthropologist Katherine Verdery in her study National Ideology under 
Socialism particularly emphasizes one of the central points of this thesis: the emergence of 
nationalist communism, which strongly influenced the minority policies of the time. In fact, 
it seems that the majority of analyses when it comes to minority issues during the communist 
period seem to come from foreign scholars. In the case of the Magyar population for 
example, there have been extensive studies carried by Hungarian scholars, such as Ferenc 
Glatz or Laszlo Antal. While their studies could make a case for an underlying interest in the 
Hungarian Diaspora, these analyses have a high degree of objectivity.  
 The last chapter of this thesis focuses on the relevance of the more imposing external 
factors in the relationship between government and ethnic minorities. With the emergence of 
the importance of the European Union, there have been a number of enthusiasts such as 
Martin Brusis or Laurence Whitehead who largely emphasized the crucial and singular role 
of this international organization. However, the degree of pressure of the EU in the case of 
the minority politics in Romania is greatly debatable, as seen in a series of analyses from 
political scientists such as Judith Kelley or Peter Vermeersch. Other scholars, such as Milada 
Anna Vachudova attempt to find explanations that touch on the continuous dynamics 
between policies in Eastern European states in general and the EU.  
Considering the large differentiation in analyses, it is my belief that there needs to be 
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a study of recurrent points for policies vis-à-vis ethnic minorities. The aim of this study is to 
uncover common patterns in minority policies throughout the twentieth century. This is a 
peculiar and often ignored aspect of the Romanian history, considering that since 1918 until 
the EU accession in 2007 Romania went from a liberal monarchy to a royal dictatorship to a 
fascist state, continuing with a communist regime and finally reaching the status of 
democracy. By separating these phases in chronological order, I am creating a general image 
of specific minority policies in Romania and their main causes.  
Internal factors created the major impetuses in the drafting and implementation of 
these policies. This analysis dismisses the belief that twentieth century external pressure has 
been fundamental in this case. In fact, it seems that the policy drafting of Romanian 
governments could largely be described as simply reactionary to the historical context. In 
essence, external factors influenced minority policies in Romania, but did not pressure and 
thus, did not have a decisive role. By ultimately defining external pressure as exertion of 
direct constraints or forceful impositions of various treaties and criteria, I finally argue that 
when it comes to its minorities, Romania was, in fact, able to determine its own fate.  
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Chapter 1 
The Interwar Period and Politics of Romanianization: 1918-1938 
 
Ever since the 1848 European Revolution, Romanians created an ideal of a unitary 
and ethnically homogeneous nation. At the end of the nineteenth century, Romania defined 
itself in ethnic terms. In fact, the ethnic conceptualization grew in popularity. It was believed 
that after World War I, and the ultimate fall of Empires, the dream of homogeneity and 
assimilation of non-Romanians would be made real. Transylvania, Bukovina and Bessarabia 
were the three main provinces that unified with the Old Kingdom, and Greater Romania 
became larger and far more diverse. How would the ideal nation come to fruition in a context 
where there was so much political, social, and cultural separation between Romanians and 
non-Romanians? The initial attempt to reconcile ethnic differences in Eastern Europe came 
externally, with the formation of the League of Nations and the imposition of the Minority 
Treaties. However, in essence, while the League of Nations managed to determine the 
framework under which minority policies were created, their fundamental nature came from 
the internal needs of Romanian nation- building. The interwar process of Romanianization 
also argues against the contemporary idea that Romania ignored its minorities during the 
interwar period.
5
 This chapter seeks to analyze the basis of the Romanian Government‟s 
national minority policies and the effect of these policies upon the national minorities during 
the interwar period. In the first part of the analysis, I will focus on the international factors 
and the importance of their role in the policy structures. In the second part, I will analyze the 
internal factors and pressures that determined the creation of a series of policies heavily 
                                                        
5
 This idea is often emphasized by civil society organizations that focus on minority rights, such as Minority 
Rights Group International.  
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based on the minority-majority relationship notably Romanian citizenship policies, 
educational and cultural policies. The third part of this chapter will focus on the Jewish 
population and policies that were heavily influenced by the radical anti-Semitic trend pushed 
by the newly formed extremist right wing. 
 
 
1.1. Post World War I Status and the League of Nations 
 
 After World War I Romania emerged as a multiethnic state patched together from 
pieces of very different European empires. The concept of Greater Romania had originated 
among the members of the National Liberal Party, most of them being products of the 1848 
Revolutions against Turkish, Greek and Russian domination in Moldavia and Wallachia.
6
 
After the Wars of Independence in 1877-1878, the outcome of the Congress of Berlin and the 
post-war treaties spurred even more vehemence among the Romanian elite against foreign 
domination. On 13 July 1878
7
 Romania‟s independence was recognized, but two conditions 
were set: elimination of all religious restrictions on the exercise of civil and political rights 
contained in Article 7 of the Constitution of 1866, and acceptance of the return of Southern 
Bessarabia to Russia.
8
 Romania was supposed to receive the Danube Delta, Serpent Island, 
Dobrogea (Dobrudja) and South Mangalia. Despite officially receiving independence, the 
Liberals in power
9
 believed that it was necessary to have a full unification, which would have 
                                                        
6
 Irina Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: regionalism, nation-building, and ethnic struggle, 
1918-1930 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1995), 4. 
7
 Romania (Moldavia and Wallachia) managed to gain independence after a war against the Ottoman Empire, 
although they, in essence, secured de facto independent in 1859. 
8
 Keith Hitchins, Rumania: 1866-1947 (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 
50. 
9
 The National Liberal Party was in power in the second half of the nineteenth century up until the 1930s. This 
is the period I will emphasize in the chapter. 
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included Transylvania, Bukovina and Bessarabia.
10
 Even more so, the role of international 
factors was put under question: how interested were the foreign powers in helping countries 
in Eastern Europe develop? In fact, the question arose, once again, after World War I. 
 The implications and reasons behind the involvement of the international community 
played a crucial role in how they influenced the process of nation building in post-World 
War I Romania. An important moment was the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, where Ion 
Brătianu, the Liberal Prime Minister of the time, was received with great hostility from the 
Western Allies. The Big Four found it necessary to punish Romania for the 1918 capitulation 
to the Great Powers by not receiving Brătianu as an equal at the negotiation table. Perhaps 
the most difficult aspect, however, was the fact that they excluded Romanian representatives 
from two commissions: those dealing with territorial boundaries and minorities.
11
 
Nevertheless, Brătianu was fully committed to the idea of Greater Romania, and appeared in 
front of the Supreme Council, pleading for acceptance of unification. Despite this initial 
disdain from the Great Powers towards the idea of unification, the mobilized population 
managed to push forward the creation of Greater Romania. On 1 December 1918, 
Transylvania, Bukovina and Bessarabia united with the Old Kingdom at the expense of now 
revolutionary Russia and of defeated Austria-Hungary. The national expansion had serious 
implications both geographically and demographically, as Romania more than doubled its 
territory and population after World War I.
12
 They added 156,000 square kilometers (in 1919 
Romania had 269,000 square kilometers in total) and 8.5 million inhabitants (in 1919, the 
                                                        
10
Stephen Fischer-Galati, “Romanian Nationalism” in  Nationalism in Eastern Europe, ed. Peter Sugar and Ivo 
Lederer (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), 389. 
11
 Hitchins, 282. 
12
 Livezeanu, 8. 
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population stood at 16,250,000 inhabitants) to the pre-war Old Kingdom.
13
 However, while 
the gains in territory, population and economic capacity were welcome in a country that had 
suffered a lot of human and economic losses during the war, the acquisition of a substantial 
number of minorities became an obstacle in the process of creating the long-desired 
homogeneous Greater Romania. In the interwar period, the most important minorities were 
the Magyars, Jews, Ukrainians and Germans: 
 
 
 Number Percentage of total 
Romanians 
Hungarians 
Germans 
Jews 
Ukrainians 
Russians 
Bulgarians 
Roma 
Others 
12,981,324 
1,425,507 
745,421 
728,115 
594,571 
409,150 
366,384 
262,501 
544,055 
71.9 
7.9 
4.1 
4.0 
3.3 
2.3 
2.0 
1.5 
3.0 
 
 
Table: The population of Greater Romania, by ethnicity, 1930
14
 
 
 With a country as ethnically diverse as Romania, a balanced source of decision-
making was imperative. It was thus expected that the several treaties concluded after World 
War I would have an important influence on the protection of minorities, which were placed 
under the guarantee of the League of Nations.  
 The League of Nations defined minorities as “groups of persons who differ in race, 
religion or language from the majority of the inhabitants of the country.”15 The principle that 
                                                        
13
 Hitchins, 290. 
14
 “Institutul central de statistica,” Anuarul statistic al Romaniei 1937 si 1938, 58-61. Taken from Livezeanu, 
10. 
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underlay the minority issues at the Paris Peace Conference was Woodrow Wilson‟s idea of 
self-determination, which gave birth to the independent states of Eastern Europe. However, 
Romanian policy-makers had to deal with the challenge of reforms that would function for 
everybody. In Bukovina, the majority of the population was of Ukrainian descent, whereas 
Russians and Russified Romanians were largely represented in Bessarabia. In Transylvania, 
the minorities, particularly Hungarians and Germans, were separated from their nations as a 
result of political settlements, designed to counter German and Hungarian claims. Hungary 
suffered the most.
16
 The Treaty of Trianon of 1920
17
 was extremely painful: Hungary lost 
two-thirds of its territory and approximately 60 percent of its population. Most of the 
Hungarian population in Romania was based in Transylvania, the largest and most diverse 
province in the newly formed country.
18
 While tagged as national minorities, they were 
entitled to have separate ethnic identities through guarantees of linguistic, cultural and 
religious rights.  But the shift from ruling nation status to national minority was difficult for 
Hungarians. The subsequent policies brought a systemized differentiation in terms of 
political, social and economic systems. The Treaty of Trianon and the negative public 
response of the Hungarians played an important role in the bilateral relationship between 
Romania and Hungary. The instability in foreign affairs between losers and winners however 
was just one part of the failure of the League of Nations and its direct impact on Romanian 
minority policies.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
15
 Helmer Rosting, “Protection of Minorities by the League of Nations,” The American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 17, No.4 (Oct., 1923), 641. 
16
 Thomas D. Musgrave, Self-determination and national minorities (Oxford: Clarendon press; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), 37-38. 
17
 “Treaty of Peace Between The Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary And Protocol and Declaration, 
Signed at Trianon June 4, 1920,”  The American Journal of International Law 15, No. 1 (January 1921), 1-4. 
18
 Sharon L. Wolchik and Jane L. Curry, eds. Central and East European Politics: From Communism to 
Democracy (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 9. 
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 The initial methods of the League of Nations in operating with the minority 
protection were extremely vague, if not non-existent. This can be clearly seen in the 1919 
Treaty of Minorities.
19
 The treaty itself emphasizes a series of state policies that needed to be 
implemented, including citizenship, educational and cultural policies, all leading to levels of 
autonomy for the new ethnic minorities.
20
 The Committee on New States was the institution 
that was designed to ensure the good functioning of the new system on minorities. It was 
assumed at the time that this system would ensure impartiality due to its juridical profile.
21
 
However, the only role the League of Nations had in policing the treaty was as a potential 
mediator and conflict resolving party. In essence, minority issues were not a matter of 
international scrutiny, leaving a lot of freedom to the successor states. International 
monitoring was surprisingly weak. Thus, the influence of the League was extremely limited 
in the upcoming state policies concerning minorities.
22
 Considering that Romania was a non-
communist and pro-status quo state, the attitude of the international community proves its 
unwillingness to get fully involved in the Romanian domestic turmoil. Besides the general 
requirements, the local governments determined the policies. The internal need to create a 
strong nation is what triggered Romania‟s particular minority policies during the interwar 
period. The League of Nations and the other Western democracies were not as involved as 
expected, the local government being forced to push for reformist policies that would clarify 
the minority status at political and social levels. 
 
                                                        
19
 “Minorităţile Naţionale din România.1918-1925,” Documente, 174-178.  
20
 Seen in Article 4,9,10,11 in the Minority Treaty of December 9, 1919 
21
 La société des Nations et de la protection des minorités de race de langue et de réligion (Geneve :Société des 
Nations, 1927), 10. 
22
 Jennifer Jackson Preece, National Minorities and the European Nation-States System (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1998), 90-91. 
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1.2. Citizenship  
  Since external involvement was scarce, the minorities‟ solution had to come 
internally. This pushed the political institutions and elites to create a framework for 
assimilation, based on the notion of Romanianization. First, they needed to clarify the 
concept of citizenship and what it actually meant within the Romanian legislature; secondly, 
there was a need for a bottom-up approach, focusing on education and training as ways to 
engineer the idea of Romanianness.  
The main features of Romanian citizenship in the interwar period were chiefly 
determined by the idea of national identity. It is by policies of citizenship that ethno-national 
structures could have been defined more clearly. In this contest, it was assumed that 
clarification of citizenship would imply social stability.  
World War I determined a radical liberalization of access to Romanian citizenship.
23
 
The first important law, “The Law on Acquiring and Losing Romanian Citizenship,” was 
established on 23 February 1924.
24
 It was perhaps the most important domestic regulation of 
what Romanian citizenship meant. It was supposedly decided based on descent (jus 
sanguinis), by marriage or by naturalization. Additionally, the law also granted citizenship 
to all the inhabitants of Bukovina, Transylvania, Banat, Crişana, Maramureş and 
Bessarabia.
25
 This brought forward an extension of jus sanguinis, dismantling the 
narrowness of laws of citizenship that existed in the Old Kingdom. This particular aspect 
received a peculiar connotation, especially when compared to the Citizenship Law of 1913 
                                                        
23
 Constantin Iordachi, “Citizenship and National Identity in Romania. A Historical Overview.”  Regio 
Yearbook (2003) , 17. 
24
 In Romanian: Legea privitoare la dobândirea şi pierderea naţionalităţii române; Art. 17-20, Capitolul 2, Codul 
Civil al Romaniei din 27/07/1993, Versiune Actualizată la data de 02/05/2001 [Civil Code of Romania from 27 
july 1993. Updated on 2 May 2001.] 
25
 “Constituţia din 1923,” Monitorul Oficial  (29 March 1923) [Constitution from 1923] 
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in Germany, descent being the only way one could acquire German citizenship. The law was 
in fact yet another step towards the emancipation of non-citizens in Romania, the citizenship 
being transformed into a “multi-ethnic and multi-confessional community.”26 When 
compared to the Romanian Constitution of 1866, which declared that only foreigners of the 
Christian rite may attain the status of Romanians,
27
 it seems that the socio-political upheaval 
of World War I stirred a liberalization of access to Romanian state citizenship.  
 
1.3. Cultural Nationalism 
In order to clarify the problems of nationalism and the concept of nation building in the 
newly formed Greater Romania, educational and cultural policies became central factors, the 
government choosing a bottom-up approach. These educational policies were products of a 
Westernized vision, emphasizing the development within. In essence, as Irina Livezeanu 
points out, the nation-building concept became a problem of the aspirations of the Romanians 
themselves.
28
 Even more so, the particular national cultural struggles that came with the 
unification determined an imperative internal, independently developed social solution. 
Consequently, during the post-war period, government stimulated school reforms that could 
work towards the creation of a viable national policy. Constantin Angelescu, Liberal Minister 
of Education in 1919, 1922-1927, and 1933-1937, worked under a National Liberal platform 
of cultural emphasis. This platform implied the development of an educational network, but 
most importantly, the unification of four different systems and traditions in the formerly 
distinct regions. In this context, the Liberal government imposed a policy of education, which 
                                                        
26
 Iordachi, 19. 
27
 Karen Barkey, “Negotiated Paths to Nationhood: a Comparison of Hungary and Romania in the Early 
Twentieth Century,” East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 14 (2000), 507. 
28
 Livezeanu, 25. 
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was a policy Romanianization that led to critical changes in the lives of national minorities in 
Transylvania, Bukovina and Bessarabia.  
 Angelescu, whose discourse was continuously focused on “spiritual unification of all 
citizens,”29 promoted reforms in 1924, 1925, and 1928. The primary school reform of 1924 
lengthened primary education to seven grades, elementary education became mandatory, and 
created a number of courses for adult illiterates.
30
 The 1928 secondary education bill reduced 
secondary school from eight to seven grades, created a one-track type of high school and 
limited numbers in both gymnasium and high school. It was the reform of 1925 however, that 
directly concerned the minorities and private schooling in languages other than Romanian.
31
 
For example, schools in which the majority of population was Jewish, the languages used 
were to be both Romanian and Hebrew.
32
 The structure of the educational policies had a 
unifying goal: creation of a Romanian national consciousness. The policies of centralization 
however provoked the disgruntlement of many national minorities in all three provinces: 
Bukovina, Bessarabia and Transylvania.  
 
1.3.1. Bukovina 
Of the three provinces newly incorporated by Romania in 1918, Bukovina was the least 
ethnically Romanian. In 1910, the Ukrainians formed the largest group in Bukovina, with 
38.4 percent of the population. Ethnic Romanians came second with 34.4 percent, followed 
                                                        
29
 Livezeanu, 35. 
30“ Ministerul Instrucţiunii.” Taken from Livezeanu, 44. 
31
 “Draft of Act Concerning Private Teaching,” Board of Education (Bucharest: Editura Cartea Romaneasca, 
1927) 
32
 “Monitorul Oficial nr. 283 din 22 decembrie 1925,” Colecţia Hamangiu, Codul general al României, legi şi 
regulamente, Vol. 9-13 (Bucharest, 1926), 582-587.[Hamangiu Collection. General Code of Romania, laws and 
regulation] 
15 
 
by Jews and German with 12 and 9.3 percent, respectively.
33
 In this context, Romanian 
schools advanced at the expense of other minorities, particularly at the expense of 
Ukrainians. The educational and cultural policies were aggressively created and used in the 
direction of Romanianization. This meant an increase in the number of Romanian schools 
and a decrease of other schools where the language and the student population was largely 
Ukrainian, German or Polish.
34
 As much as Ukrainians protested, their demands of a return 
to the Ukrainian system of schooling, including use of language, were extensively ignored. 
Romania reinterpreted, however, the Minority Protection Treaty, by claiming that the 
Ukrainians were Ruthenized Romanians who needed to be brought back to the original 
identity.  
The experience of Bukovina proves that the post-War Minority Treaties almost had no 
value when it came to their implementation in the Romanian political culture. Political 
institutions used a discourse centered on the inability of the international factors to 
comprehend the domestic context, including who was Romanian and who was not. It can be 
argued that, they took advantage of the international community‟s ignorance of Romanian 
domestic issues and its inhabitants. It would have been difficult to predict how ethnic 
minorities would have reacted to the unification, even if the Minority Treaties and the 
platform of the League of Nations had functioned. However, the aggressive Romanian 
campaign left Bukovina in a civil collapse. This was even more determined by socio-political 
repression: the gerrymandering of administrative districts and the prohibition of the use of 
Ukrainian in local government, courts and commerce. The aggressive cultural policies also 
determined the transfer of teachers from Bukovina to the Old Kingdom. The groups that were 
                                                        
33
 Livezeanu, 49. 
34
 German and Polish populations were not directly targeted because their number was significantly lower than 
that of the Ukrainians. 
16 
 
supposed to be transferred were mainly Ruthenian teachers who were against these strategies 
of nation building.
35
 
 
1.3.2. Bessarabia 
Bessarabia had been separated for 106 years under Russian rule, before it unified with 
Romania in 1918. Throughout this time, ethnic and linguistic aspects became inherently 
different than the Romanian ones. The long processes of Russification after Moldavia‟s 
partition in 1812 had been far too invasive, and this became a factor of concern for Romanian 
authorities. Bessarabia was, in fact, not as connected with the Old Kingdom as Bukovina or 
Transylvania was. Russian was often considered the proper culture and language, and 
Romanian was simply disregarded even by the Moldavian elites. Thus, the propaganda and 
policies that determined the cultural assimilation were extremely difficult to implement.  
 The school system did not suffer immense transformations, mostly because the 
Romanian government knew that administrative changes could not have been implemented 
too suddenly. There was an intrinsic need to get closer to Moldavians through other methods. 
Thus, the initial policies were designed in order to tackle the language issue: teachers learned 
the Latin alphabet, studied Romanian grammar, and Romanian history and literature became 
important subjects that they had to master. The Bessarabian peculiarity, however, was that, 
unlike Bukovina, the cultural life was mostly designed by activities outside school. In this 
context, the Department of Extracurricular Activity published and distributed books, 
pamphlets, calendars, periodicals, pictures, or maps that were designed to support the 
                                                        
35
 Livezeanu, 74. 
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campaign of Romanianization.
36
 These changes managed to be implemented also due to the 
initial tolerance of the Moldavians, who did not dismiss the Romanian presence. 
However, in almost twenty years of imposed Romanian domination, there had been no 
crucial changes in schools, Russian remaining the main influence in the educational 
spectrum. This can be easily interpreted as a failure of the extensive campaign of 
Romanianization due to the Bessarabians‟ natural sense of belonging. Even though they did 
not respond aggressively to the campaigns, they simply did not see themselves culturally 
speaking as part of Greater Romania. Despite these circumstances, Romanians tried to 
change this unique cultural autonomy and impose assimilation in an extremely short period 
of time.
37
 In this case, it is difficult to imagine how the implemented cultural policies could 
have changed in only twenty years certain ways of life and self-definition that had developed 
over a hundred years.  
 
1.3.3. Transylvania 
Transylvania was the largest province to join Romania in 1918. Largely under Austro-
Hungarian influence, it had often been subjected to a process of Magyarization in the 
nineteenth century. Unlike Bessarabians, Transylvanian Romanians had a deep sense of 
belonging to Romania, which led to clashes with the other ethnic minorities: Magyars, 
Germans, and Jews. Even today, both Romanians and Hungarians often debate the provisions 
of the Trianon Treaty. The former believe in its justice, whereas the latter contest its 
legitimacy.  
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  The unification of the educational system was, once again, the main aim. Generally, 
there was a consensus that the intense Magyar influence required an immediate form of 
Romanianization. The Romanian state took over the entire primary education system of 
Hungarian state. In Hungarian districts, the language of instruction in these schools was 
Hungarian, but they fully became Romanian schools. The state put a lot of pressure 
especially on confessional schools. This was a process of encroachment, as Romanian was 
supposed to be taught as a subject. It pressured students into attending schools and prevented 
persons of Romanian origin, who had been Magyarized before World War I and had lost 
their mother tongue, from attending Hungarian schools.
38
 The Directing Council‟s Public 
Education and Religion Department also created new schools. In this context, it organized 
training courses for minority teachers in order to immerse them in Romanian history, 
geography and language. The Directing Council signed the first decree on 24 January 1919. 
It established Romanian as the official language. However, the minority interests were not 
completely excluded. In state primary schools the language of instruction would be that of 
the majority of the population in a community. In essence, the Romanian state took over the 
primary education system of the Hungarian state. In Hungarian districts, in secondary school 
they would use the language of the majority of population of the county. On the other hand, 
higher education would be subjected to teaching in the language of the majority population in 
the whole Transylvanian region.
39
 
The minorities in Transylvania, particularly the Magyars, received the educational 
nationalism policy with suspicion. They had been greatly overrepresented in public 
secondary and higher education, which now became substantially Romanian. In a 
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geopolitical sense, they simply refused to accept the fact that they lost a big part of their 
territory, and immediately after the unification they were still hoping for a diplomatic 
resolution. In fact, the Hungarian language continued to be heavily present in many towns. 
But since education was under a strong reformist policy, Hungarian churches and 
confessional schools became places of autonomy, which heightened their already pervasive 
ethnic nationalism.
40
 Fundamentally, education policies and Romanianization complemented 
one another.   
 
1.4. The Jews of Greater Romania 
 Even before World War I, the Romanian approach to the Jews had had a peculiar 
trajectory. Romania wanted to maintain a strong political and economic relationship with the 
West, who pressed for civil rights for Romania‟s Jews. The Congress of Berlin in July 1878 
emphasized, thus, both the independence of Romania, but also Jewish emancipation. 
However, Romanian authorities refused to agree with the dictate of the Congress and 
announced that “there were not, and that there never have been, any Romanian Jews; there 
were merely Jews who had been born in the Principality, but who had never been 
assimilated, either in speech or in custom, by the Romanian nation.”41 Nevertheless, 
economic dependence played a crucial role in the subsequent developments: the need for 
Western support led to a compromise. Jews had the possibility of becoming naturalized 
citizens of Romania, but only individually, based on the qualities of each applicant.
42
 From 
then on, the Jewish population was subjected to a process of social integration, based entirely 
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on an economic process of embourgeoisement. Consequently, a good part of Jews found 
success in areas such as commerce, industry, medicine, and journalism. In this context, a 
considerable portion of the Jewish population adopted language and culture of the Romanian 
middle class of the urban areas.
43
 As a result, it can be argued that anti-Semitism and ethnic 
nationalism were exacerbated by feelings of insecurity among the elite who believed that 
they were losing control over their own society and institutions.  
In the post World War I era, the status of Romania changed dramatically both 
geographically and ethnically speaking. The Western powers put pressure once again on 
Romanian officials to grant civil rights to its Jews. Once more, Romanians regarded this as 
an unfair attitude towards their internal issues. However, on 22 May 1919, the Romanian 
government promulgated a law granting citizenship to all Jews born in the country, those 
who held no other citizenship, and those who had served in the army at the front, as well as 
their families.
44
  On the surface, the international leverage determined the policies 
surrounding the citizenship of the Jewish population. Nevertheless, I argue that the new 
geographical and ethnic profile led to the necessity of a cohesive population, culturally and 
linguistically speaking. Therefore, nationalistic aims played a more crucial role in the 
upgrading of the Jewish population immediately after the Unification of 1918.  
 The policies around Jews were developed within a context of a poor, agricultural 
economy, where the process of industrialization had just begun. Furthermore, the conflict 
between Conservatives and Liberals also had an influence on perceptions and policies 
concerning Jews. The Liberals, who were in power in the pre-war period, because of their 
opposition to the Conservatives and their distaste for foreigners, developed a platform mainly 
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focused on the peasantry, heavily ignoring the middle class, including Jews. Finally, the 
focus on the realm of development in internal affairs and Romanianism took its toll on the 
Jewish population. If the other minorities became the governmental focus, the Jews became 
the pariah of the society, the group that did not qualify under the concept of the ideal 
Romania. Even more so, despite the existence of a Jewish Party during the 1930s, full 
incorporation of Jews into the political body was never discussed since it was never an option 
in the minds of Romanian politicians and intellectuals.
45
 
Livezeanu points out that the Jews were the “minority most defended by the Western 
governments and international institutions, and the most urban and most overrepresented 
minority on Romanian university rolls.”46 The new cultural policies subjected the Jewish 
minority to a series of changes that disrupted the social dynamics. If the Jews had had free 
access to all Austrian schools in Bukovina, they were ghettoized into Jewish schools that 
were in turn being subjected to the process of Romanization. By the mid-1920s, the Jewish 
community in Cernăuţi47 was already angry about anti-Semitic measures based on 
discrimination in education. In essence, Jewish primary and secondary school administrators 
were being fired or simply underemployed. Moreover, the state did not sustain normal 
financial support for the reconstruction of Jewish schools and other public buildings. In this 
context, the Jewish parents had to pay for the construction of Jewish schools, but the Jewish 
community did not receive its fair share of taxes for rebuilding prayer houses damaged 
during the war. This basically signaled the end of a period in which, in theory, on a strictly 
legal level, Jews had enjoyed both equal rights and social privileges.
48
In 1924, the citizenship 
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of the “new”49 Jews was limited by the Romanian parliament, whereas in January 1938, forty 
percent of the Romanian Jews were deprived of the naturalization right.  Writer Emil 
Dorian
50
 wrote in his diary in 1938:  
Of all the steps taken against Jews, none seems to me more insulting and underhanded than the latest 
decree: to reevaluate their right to citizenship. I never expected persecution to take this form. If the 
Jews had any courage and dignity left, not a single one would go through with it. Citizenship was 
granted once and for all. It is an historic act meant for all eternity. How can one  conceive such an 
inept thing as a reevaluation of this law, which created for the Jews moral, political, and 
socioeconomic realities? (…) What value can be attached to citizenship when it can be withdrawn at 
any minister‟s whim? What guarantee is there that other governments will not imitate this shameful 
action? 
51
 
  
Despite the controversy around xenophobia and anti-Semitism, the initial anti-Jewish 
measures were far more directed at the assimilation of the other minorities, and to the 
development of the process of Romanianization. It was the nation-building governmental 
ideology that lay at the core of the minority treatment. In Bukovina, for example, as Jews 
played an important role in the elite within the Austrian system, the subsequent unseating of 
the Jewish population was a symbol of Romanian achievements. It was also a way to involve 
the other minorities in the elite layer of the society, by giving them new jobs and status 
previously held by the Jewish population. Anti-Semitism was “in one sense a by-product of 
Romania‟s efforts to assert its interests. It created and supported extreme forms of 
nationalism, which translated in great tensions both locally and nationally.”52  
 One of the movements that had serious social and political implications was the 
student movement. Post-war Romania met a dual role of nationalism: on one hand it 
facilitated the basis of nation-building policies, but on the other hand it facilitated the 
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emergence of extreme nationalistic social and political groups, such as the Generation 1922 
and the Legion of the Archangel Michael or the Iron Guard, with the former being 
determined by the nationalist student movement. The students often condemned the National 
Liberal Party for complying with the demands of Minority Treaties by creating the 1923 
Constitution. However, this nationalistic group became so radical that even the League of 
National Christian Defense, a rather conservative party, was not able to cover their demands. 
Consequently, the conservative wing gained an extremist party, the League of Archangel 
Michael, led by Corneliu Zelea Codreanu. Fascist ideology became an answer to a period of 
crisis and ethnic clashes.  
 Theoretically, Codreanu‟s ideology was heavily based on the European-wide belief 
that Jews were connected to Bolshevism. At the same time, the Legion was unusual for 
Fascism, as it was a religious movement that considered Orthodoxy a way towards validation 
of beliefs. Its ideology was focused on the creation of the new man, who was to embody 
Orthodoxy at a moral level.
53
 The Legionnaires who died in the Spanish Civil War were 
generally seen as saints. Thus, Jews were seen as the ultimate evil on an ethnic or religious 
basis, a foreign corruption poisoning Romania. They were the Antichrist and the future of the 
nation was defined as a battle against the Bolshevik-Judaic alliance.
54
 Scholars such as S.G. 
Payne have considered Romanian fascist parties as vehemently anti-Semitic as the Germany 
Nazi Party.
55
 It is no mean feat, considering that the Iron Guard, led by Codreanu, in the 
December 1937 national elections obtained sixteen percent of the popular vote, making it the 
third strongest party. On the 28 December 1937, an anti-Semitic government was appointed 
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to lead Romania.  In one of its first acts, the new government undermined the Jewish 
minority residing in Romania by banning Jewish newspapers, Jewish public servants, cutting 
off state aid to Jewish institutions, and invalidating Jewish citizenship documents issued after 
the start of the World War I. Later on, by King Carol II‟ s decree,56 approximately 225,000 
Jews or approximately 36 per cent of Romania‟s Jewish population lost their citizenship.57 
 Policies of eugenics also played an important role in defining the state policies 
towards minorities in the interwar period, specifically towards Jews, heavily connecting 
Romania of the second half of the 1930s to Nazi Germany. Eugenists based their policy 
proposals on discourses of cohesion and homogeneity, on the creation of the “new man” 
Codreanu was aiming for. In this sense, non-Romanians formed the largest group that 
became a focus of exclusion from the healthy nation. Several eugenists also focused on 
defining Romanianness in biological and anthropological terms. Two of the most prominent 
“scientists” were Sabin Manuilă and Iordache Făcăoaru.58 In an article published in 1938, 
Făcăoaru depicted Jews as “dead weight…a mortal danger for the nation.” He was 
specifically aiming towards complete exclusion from society by controlling marriages and by 
sterilization of the “unwanted population.”59 Sabin Manuilă on the other hand believed that 
by nature of their cultural and social traditions, Jews had already segregated themselves; 
hence, they did not pose such a great threat to the Romanian population. In Manuilă‟s view, 
the Jewish danger was economic rather than racial. Thus, he believed in the exploitation of 
these resources for the greater needs of the Romanian state, a measure implemented by the 
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Antonescu regime after 1940. His discourse was largely based on Nazi ideology, identifying 
the source of corruption and degeneracy not within the system, but rather in the shape of 
these “impostors,” who were intoxicating the elite, and the state as a whole.60 
 Fundamentally, the Jews became a growing “problem” for Greater Romania. It 
seemed that in the second half of the 1930s the Jewish population became the main obstacle 
for the goals for extreme nationalists. For this reason nationalism played a crucial role vis-à-
vis the policies that targeted the Jewish; hence, anti-Semitism and policies surrounding it 
became elements of social fracture.  
 
 
 After the First World War, Romania found itself in a peculiar position: the long 
awaited unification had happened, but the social, economic and political difficulties seemed 
to overshadow the national enthusiasm. The problems of the minorities in Transylvania, 
Bukovina and Bessarabia had to be fixed in order for the newly formed country to have a 
legitimate sense of identity. The Western pressures, created largely under the form of the 
League of Nations, played a rather weak role in the policy-making process. Despite a series 
of Minority Treaties, Romanians turned to their own polity and interests, determining the 
creation of concepts such as Romanianness and Romanianization. In this context, there was a 
need to clarify what citizenship was and how Romanians and non-Romanians were defined 
within the new Romanian borders. By opening citizenship to a large percentage of the 
population, Romanians were re-defining their identity. In this sense, the government took an 
assimilative approach towards Romanianization, largely focusing on ethno-cultural and 
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educational policies, which led to a re-education of students from Transylvania, Bukovina 
and Bessarabia. However, if Hungarians, Germans, Ukrainians or Russians had largely been 
under a process of assimilation, the Jews were victims of social segregations.  
 The status of the Jews within the society and the response of the Romanian 
population had been debatable ever since the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Nevertheless, the attempts to define Romanian identity put great pressure on the Jews, who 
were largely seen as corrupting factors of society. In this context, it was the Romanian 
extremist nationalism that developed anti-Semitic discourses and policies of eugenics.  
 Thus, it can be argued that nationalism played a dual role when it comes to the 
process of nation building in interwar Romania. On one hand, it led to a largely liberal form 
of integration and even assimilation. On the other hand, it was heavily supporting separation 
and segregation, as seen in the case of Jews. In essence, while by the end of the 1930s the 
Nazi vision played an important role in the Romanian policy-making spectrum; it is by the 
inner-need for security and uncorrupted Romanianness that anti-Semitic policies came to 
fruition.  
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Chapter 2 
 
 Carol II: Between Political Expediency and Nazism: 1938-1940  
 
 
In the context of an emerging right wing, the status of the monarchy was significantly 
changing. While Carol II, Ferdinand‟s nephew, was taking over the power, Codreanu was 
augmenting the anti-Semitic discourse. But, in fact, most other rightists systematically 
targeted Jews as the main enemies of Romanians. These rightists saw themselves gravitating 
towards Carol, who ultimately orchestrated a radical shift to the right in domestic policy and 
to the pro-German orientation in foreign policy.  In the following section, I will be discussing 
Carol‟s political expediency as the main engine of the relationship between the state and its 
minorities. 
In standard Romanian history, the era of Carol II is known for its economic 
development.
61
 In comparison to the long Communist period, which receives the bulk of 
popular disapproval, the Carol era has often been misjudged, especially since 1989, as a 
comparatively ideal period.  However, political extremism and centralization began to take 
shape, a predicament that Romania struggled with for the next 50 years.  
Theoretically, Carol‟s ideas centered on concepts of what I will call a 
“quasidictatorship.” These ideas came about slowly and they were mostly consequences of 
his attempts to take Romania closer to Germany and Spain to a certain extent, an idea fully 
supported by his government. In one of his daily notes, he mentions a dialogue with 
Constantin Argetoianu, prime-minister during the interwar period:
62
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Argetoianu believes in a tough government, he believes that the dissoluteness so-called democratic is 
not what the country needs. His solution is that I, personally, take power in hand, some sort of 
quasidictatorship, with a constitutional change.  
I was rather impressed by what he said.
63
  
 
 His enthusiastic speeches about Hitler, Mussolini or Salazar have forced some 
assumptions that underlying fascist ideas triggered his policies. Historian Vladimir Solonari, 
however, argues that he did not like the “revolutionary” dimension of their regimes, but 
rather the authoritarian style of their government.
64
 Furthermore, I argue that in Carol‟s case, 
the involvement of the international factors, particularly fascist states and leaders, in the early 
part of his reign
65
 was minimal. The theoretic level of these regimes—authoritarianism, 
rejuvenation, purity of race—only matched his political personality and self-perception. His 
reign could easily be described as erratically controlled, focused on the process of 
centralization and the need to turn himself into the main actor in the decision-making 
process. This can be clearly seen in the relationship between the Crown and the rest of the 
Romanian political environment. Purposefully abusing the Constitution, Carol named prime 
ministers that were mostly flexible and ready to be submissive to his wishes. In fact, there is 
a belief that Carol could have been easily controlled had his authoritarian tendencies been 
resisted by Romanian politicians.
66
 In fact, this cult of expediency and the impetus to create a 
great monarchic state from a socio-economic and political standpoint were the elements that 
determined the policies towards national minorities.  
It would be fairly simple to describe Carol‟s anti-Semitic politics as being influenced 
by the Nazis or perhaps forced by the necessity to have an ally. However, the domestic 
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political turmoil and his authoritarian capacities lead to think otherwise.  By the end of the 
1930s, anti-Semitism was an incredibly popular trend domestically, complying perfectly with 
the events of the international arena. Furthermore, Carol‟s popularity plummeted due to his 
on-going affair with Elena Lupescu, a woman perceived as vulgar and corrupt. However, her 
main flaw was considered to be the fact that she was born Jewish, a proof of the boiling 
social anti-Semitism in Romania. Additionally, Romanian political life suffered a crisis 
moment when the Gheorghe Tatarascu government resigned in December 1937. Carol re-
appointed Tatarascu because he embodied everything the King liked in a prime minister: 
flexibility, submission, and full collaboration. In this context, Iuliu Maniu, the leader of the 
National Liberal Party and Codreanu signed a nonagression pact, which reached its 
immediate result: the government lost the election, for the first time in Romanian history. 
Consequently, Carol abolished the constitution and established a royal dictatorship between 
1938 and 1940. Otherwise, any type of opposition would have been problematic for his 
power. However, while politically this might have been seen as a direct and obvious victory 
for Carol, he still had a great problem left in his way to fully attain power: the Jews. 
67
 This 
was rather surprising, as he emphasized in his personal notes that anti-Semitism was not to be 
desired from a government: 
With Codreanu it is impossible. He wants to create a full destruction of social order and of our 
traditional foreign policy. (…) Normally, after the picture of the electoral presence, I should have 
called Codreanu. Nobody, except for the Legionnaires, would have approved this. To me, it was an 
impossible issue. The terrorist methods he had adopted, violent anti-Semitism, their ideas obviously 
radical in foreign policy, the destruction of alliances, the anti-natural desire to approach Germany only, 
in general in every radical and anti-social methods.”68 
 
His subsequent policies diminish this initial approach.  On 22 January 1938, Carol 
signed the Decree Law 169 on reviewing Jews‟ citizenship status. Through this law, all Jews 
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who received citizenship after World War I (i.e. a great majority of the Jewish residents of 
Romania since the 1866 constitution virtually barred them from gaining Romanian 
citizenship) had to submit their papers for verification within forty days.
69
 As a result, 
approximately 73, 253 Romanian Jewish families, or 225, 220 individual Jews lost their 
citizenship.
70
 Furthermore, the government adopted other anti-Semitic measures, including 
shutting down a number of national newspapers that were seen as being controlled by “self-
serving Jews.” Jews closed their businesses, stocks plummeted, and Western democratic 
governments subjected the King to intense diplomatic pressure. Istrate Micescu, the foreign 
minister who was responsible for leading the campaign to exclude Jewish lawyers from the 
Bucharest bar, while defending the anti-Semitic programme to the British and French 
ministers in Bucharest as necessary to avoid an Iron Guard government and promising 
moderation in its application, was at the same time telling the German counterpart that „anti-
Semitic measures would be intensified.”71 The decree was designed to enhance emigration of 
the Jews, which would have led, in the government‟s view, to domestic peace. But, in fact, 
the country was on the brink of collapse from a civil and economic standpoint.  
The way the other minorities were treated questions, once again, the growing Nazi 
impact on Carol‟s regime and the potential goal of population homogeneity. The other 
minorities were, in fact, treated better than under democracy. For example, their 
representatives were encouraged to enter the National Renaissance Front (FRN).
72
 In 1939, 
the Ministry of National Economy stipulated that the 1934 Law on the usage of enterprise 
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personnel limited employment of foreign citizens only. The term Romanian had to be 
understood according to constitutional provisions, as being equivalent with that of Romanian 
citizen.
73
 What Carol did when it came to minorities was to continue the same interwar 
pattern of assimilation vs. segregation. He wanted to centralize his power as much as 
possible; therefore, the solution seemed easy at the time: anti-Jews policies on one hand, and 
support of the rest of the minorities on the other. Evidently, this is not a nationalistic attempt 
to re-inforce the importance of Romanian identity. It is an attempt to augment the legitimacy 
of the centralized state, a major internal impetus. The change in approach can be considered a 
form of hypernationalism, his discourse often times being centered on ideas of “tyranny that 
needed to be destroyed, lack of patriotism, and benefits of the country.”74  In Carol‟s case, 
nationalism became a tool in the greater plans of personal power. It is also unarguably true 
that Carol‟s concerns about minorities were initially based on what was happening at a 
domestic level, crises that were deeply rooted in the issues that had transpired during the first 
decade after unification. But the erratic way of leading the country, all directed for self-
purposes, is a basic proof of political and monarchical interest. Carol primarily used political 
schemes in order to maintain power and this is what led to a foreign policy that was hitched 
to Nazi Germany. 
It was clear by the end of the 1930s that the balance of power in Europe had 
drastically changed. Carol needed economic links
75
 with Germany so that his dream of the 
greatest monarchy could have been reached. Furthermore, he hoped that Germans would 
defend Romania against the Soviet threat. Finally, he aimed to convince the Germans to 
guarantee Romanian territorial integrity, mostly against the Hungarians‟ revisionist claims on 
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Transylvania.
76
 Politically, Romania, a secondary power, was merely reacting to events in the 
international arena. After the start of World War II, on 26 June 1940, the Soviet Union 
demanded immediate cession of Bessarabia and Bukovina. Much to Carol‟s surprise, 
however, the Germans advised them to concede. The country was left in a deeply rooted 
crisis at an international level too. 
The fear of the Soviets was extremely prevalent domestically. Thus, the Germans 
were chosen against the Soviets, and not because they put immense pressure at this stage or 
because of an ideological affinity. On 3 July 1940, Carol named Ion Gigurtu as the new 
prime-minister. Backing the collective idea that Jews were the allies of the Soviets, Gigurtu 
Government is known for two crucial anti-Semitic laws of 8 August 1940. The first law 
introduced the new legal definition of a Jew and severely restricted civil and political rights 
of thus defined persons. The second law banned marriages between Romanians “by blood” 
and Jews. Jews who naturalized under the legislation of the Old Kingdom were the least 
discriminated against, whereas those subjected to the post-1918 naturalization were the most 
affected. The reasoning behind it was perfectly emphasized in the official expression of the 
Jewish community‟s attitude regarding loss of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina: 
The Jews in the Old Kingdom-native Romanian Jews-born and raised in generations on the land of 
Romania, are and remain bound wholeheartedly to the Romanian soil, soil generously watered with the 
blood of their best sons, fallen in the War of Independence of 1877, in that of 1913, and in the Great 
War of 1916-1918. Their ideals have always meshed with those of all Romanians, and whatever may 
happen, and whatever they may endure, as always they are ready to be alongside the Romanian people, 
in understanding of their destiny which binds them inextricably to this land. 
77
 
 
 The state was now founded on a new, biological concept of nation.
78
 According to 
Ion V. Gruia, professor of law at University of Bucharest, and one of the promoters of the 
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two anti-Jews laws, “the nation…had become less of a legal or political community and more 
of a spiritual and organic community, relying on the law of the blood, from which a hierarchy 
of political rights stems.”79  
However, once Hitler started to win territory in Europe, he started pressuring Carol to 
agree on the “ethnic principle” and start negotiating with Hungary and Bulgaria. The “ethnic 
principle” was a concept based on the idea that territories and populations would be 
exchanged, leading to a purification of race.  This idea was not particularly hurtful for 
Romania, since it had to cede 10,000 square kilometers if all ethnic Hungarians would leave 
the country, or 7,000 square kilometers if only ethnic Hungarians residing in rural areas 
would have been expelled. Those were low numbers. In a change of action, however, there 
was to be German-Italian arbitration, the conclusion being: Romania was to cede Hungary 
42, 243 square kilometers with a population of 2.6 million of which, according to Romanian 
data, 1.3 milion were Romanians and 975,000 Hungarians.
80
   
It could be argued that, on the surface, it seemed that Romanians indeed were 
subjected to direct external influences and constraints. However, an alliance with the Nazis 
and the subsequent “ethnic principle” implications were something that the radical 
nationalists in the government had sought after since the early 1930s. Mihail Manoilescu, the 
foreign minister at the time, declared: 
Only by moving along this road can one guarantee the preservation and fortification of the thing which 
is the most precious for a people, namely its ethnic substance… 
To bring within the Romanian state all Romanians from outside its borders…so that not even one 
Romanian is left outside of its frontiers, and to diminish as much as possible the numbers of the 
[members of] minorities in Romania, constitute two best measures for the attainment of which any 
effort is welcome and any means is fitting. 
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On the other hand [,]…the country can attain a perfect Romanian homogeneity and Romanians can 
start feeling themselves…masters in their own home only if the problem of our Jewish element is 
solved by categorical and determined measures.
81
  
 
No other government had proclaimed such extreme laws concerning minorities 
beforehand, because, simply put, no extreme nationalists had been in power up to that point. 
In the end, Carol was surrounded by a great number of right-wingers, who promoted the 
existence of a racial state. Furthermore, his efforts to create a strong alliance with the Third 
Reich failed. Finally, he was forced to give up Bessarabia and northern Bukovina to the 
Soviet Union (June 26-28, 1940), northwestern Transylvania to Hungary (The Second 
Vienna Award-August 30, 1940) and southern Dobroudja to Bulgaria (The Treaty of 
Craiova-September 8, 1940). As a result, he was forced to abdicate. His son Michael (Mihai) 
became king and General Ion Antonescu prime minister. In reality, Antonescu became 
dictator of the country with the title of Conducator, Leader, a translation of the German 
Fuehrer.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Ion Antonescu’s Racial Romanian State: 1940-1944 
 
 
 By the end of the 1930s, Germany started a new conflict, as Hitler was attempting to 
impose German hegemony across Europe.
82
 It is without doubt that Hitler used an aggressive 
foreign policy, leading to the debate on the true responsibility for the death of the Jews 
within the Romanian territory, specifically in Bessarabia, Bukovina and Transnistria.
83
 Ion 
Antonescu‟s power of decision-making in Romania is unarguable.  The quality of his role has 
been however relatively debatable: on one hand his policies were heavily anti-Semitic and 
hypernationalist. On the other hand, he contributed decisively to the survival of Jews in 
Walachia, Moldova and Transylvania due to his 1942 decision to postpone indefinitely the 
deportation of the Romanian Jews to Poland. During his trial in 1946, Antonescu emphasized 
that if the Jews of Romania are still alive, this is due to Ion Antonescu.”84  To a certain 
extent, Antonescu‟s role in the minority policies of the time has been consistently blurred 
because of its presence in political and media discourse. Historian Constantin Iordachi 
identified two trends of interpretation: the functionalist trend, which emphasizes the role 
played by the external factors in the destruction of the Romanian Jews and the intuitionalist 
trend, which focuses on the internal political factors.
85
 On the other hand, Irina Livezeanu 
argues that the fall of the Communist regime determined a new interest in the issues 
associated with the near destruction of Romanian Jews and in Antonescu‟s role. Due to a 
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post-Ceausescu resurgence of nationalism, there has been an attempt to minimize the role of 
Ion Antonescu in his anti-Jewish policy.
86
  Romanian Holocaust and Antonescu became 
focuses of political rhetoric in the post-1945 period.  
 
3.1. Antonescu’s Anti-Jewish Policies: Defending the Sacred Space 
 
  
 At the beginning of the 1940s Romania had already been going through a phase of 
extreme political centralization due to Carol‟s Royal Dictatorship (1938-1940). In essence, 
Ion Antonescu came to power in a time of crisis. Theoretically, this authoritarian regime tried 
to imitate Fascist Italy and reoriented the foreign policy according to the European context of 
polarization of powers on the eve of the outbreak of World War II. Furthermore, the fall of 
France, Romania‟s traditional ally, in June 1940 left Romania between Nazi Germany and 
the Soviet Union.
87
  The subsequent abdication of Carol II led to the establishment of the 
National Legionary State on 13 September 1940, with Ion Antonescu as Conducator and 
Horia Sima, the leader of the Iron Guard, as vice-prime minister.
88
 The main goal of the 
newly formed state was a continuation of the interwar process of Romanianization. Between 
6 September 1940 and 22 January 1941, fifteen Jews were murdered in Romania.
89
 These 
activities of the Iron Guard exacerbated the political fracture between Antonescu and the Iron 
Guard. Although a fascist in his convictions and behavior, Antonescu was revolted by the 
administrative and economic disorder brought on by the Legionnaire‟s corruption and 
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incompetence, which created confusion and difficulties everywhere in the country‟s system.90  
In the end, the alliance did not last due to these differences in political vision and Antonescu 
decided to oust the Legionnaires. Antonescu forbade the activities of the Iron Guard 
commissars responsible for the ongoing process of Romanianization.
91
  
 The main concern for Antonescu was the economic disaster the Legionnaires left 
Romania in. For many of them, the process of Romanianization was merely a means to 
acquire wealth. In this context, the General‟s interests were affected. He aimed for full 
control of economy and Jews in a perfectly legal context. The Romanian interests coincided 
with the ones of Germany, which also needed a strong Romanian economy. In the summer of 
1938 Romanian oil became one of the greatest interests for Germany diplomacy.
92
  
 The conflict between Antonescu and the Legionnaires peaked during the Bucharest 
pogrom (21-23 January 1941). It can be considered a suicidal act of the Legionnaires. The 
aftermath of the pogrom of Bucharest was unexpected. The Iron Guard started a series 
terrorist actions played a crucial part in the development of the subsequent events.
93
 
Antonescu‟s political self-interest led to the underlying necessity to restore order in the 
country. For an extremely centralized state like Romania, the Legionnaires were a great 
danger for the society; hence, their destruction was imperative. Antonescu crushed the fascist 
movement, “denounced their terrorist methods and even obliquely portrayed them as Nazi 
underlings.”94 In a study on the fascist regimes in Europe, Mihai Fatu and Gheorghe Zaharia 
describe Antonescu as a progressive figure due to the fact that he silenced the Iron Guard.
95
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The National-Legionary state was abolished on 14 February 1941 and was replaced with an 
authoritarian regime in which senior officers and ministers took orders directly from 
Antonescu, a further step in the process of power centralization in Romania.  
 The events in Bucharest put into question Antonescu‟s image as both a radical anti-
Semitist and a puppet who worked for Hitler‟s interests. In this case, it seems that the need to 
protect the state, the nation and the personal political interests of the Marshal played a greater 
role in his decision-making process. Also, the initial lack of minority policies and the focus 
on the Legionnaires in the early days of his state-power also raise underlying questions about 
the policy impetuses at this point. In fact, although it adopted some elements of Nazi 
Germany and Fascist Italy, the regime was a military dictatorship. The monarchy did not 
have any further prerogatives and was transformed into a symbol of statehood.
96
  
 It can further be argued that the relationship between Hitler and Antonescu was also 
problematic. Prior to September 1940, Antonescu 'had no close ties to the Reich. He came to 
power in a vacuum, inheriting a situation created by Carol‟s aims of aligning with German 
foreign policy: “I went with Germany because I found the country committed to this policy, 
and no one then, whoever he might have been, could have given it a different direction 
without the risk of bringing ruin to the entire country”‟97 Also, his anti-communist feelings 
played a crucial role in choosing his allies. In 1941, following Pearl Harbor, Antonescu 
noted: “I am an ally of the Reich against Russia. I am neutral in the conflict between Great 
Britain and Germany. I am for America against the Japanese.”98  
                                                        
96
 Florin Constantiniu, O istorie sincera a poporului roman (Bucuresti: Editura Univers Enciclopedic, 1997), 
394 
 
97
 Deletant, 51 
98
 Deletant, 92 
39 
 
 Another theory besides the German pressure on Antonescu‟s anti-Semitic policies 
was based on his inherent loathing of Judaism. On 6 September 1941, in a letter to Mihai 
Antonescu, his Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister during World War II wrote:  
Everybody should understand that this is not a struggle with the Slavs but one with the Jews. It is a 
fight to the death. Either we will win and the world will purify itself, or they will win and we will 
become their slaves…The war, in general, and the fight for Odessa, especially have proven that Satan 
is the Jew.
99
 
 
 One of the most revealing documents in this sense is the letter he sent on 29 October 
1942 to Liberal Party leader C.I.C. Bratianu, after canceling his decision to deport the Jews 
from southern Transylvania, Moldova and Wallachia to Poland: 
 
The Romanian people are no longer subject to the servitude imposed by the Congress of Berlin in 
1878, by the amendment of Article 7 of the Constitution [granting Jews citizenship], nor the 
[humiliation] imposed after the last war as concerns the minorities.
100
  
 
 Without a doubt Antonescu was anti-Semitic. He was a product of his time and 
Romania was an anti-Semitic country by and large. The extent to which his policy making 
decisions were ultimately influenced by this hatred is debatable.  While the personality 
analysis approach could offer an interesting and plausible explanation, the contradictions 
within Antonescu‟s policies demonstrate a more complex issue.  
 A close look at Antonescu‟s anti-Semitic comments in the Council of Ministers‟ 
meetings reveals a more comprehensive picture of the actual reasons behind his policies 
towards ethnic minorities. On several occasions, Antonescu presented his plans for the 
restructuring of the country‟s social and economic life, in which the need to maintain public 
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order and to romanize the economy were part of a more ambitious project of purifying 
Romania of Jews and Roma and creating an ethnocentric state. 
101
  According to Antonescu‟s 
personal secretary Gheorghe Barbul, Hitler asked the general to restore order during the 
pogrom in Bucharest. The reply was simply: “Please do so; I have no use for fanatics. I need 
a healthy Romanian army.”102  This ultimately proves that his aims to protect the country 
went beyond his inner beliefs. In fact, it can be argued that domestic interests flanked by 
hypernationalistic personal ideologies, along with a deep understanding of the international 
context played a crucial role in what Antonescu saw as a necessity for the survival of the 
state: a crusade against ethnic minorities, particularly Jews, and against communism. 
 Antonescu‟s policy against Jews was clearly explained in a letter to Wilhelm 
Filderman, the leader of the Jewish community: 
 
All the Jews who came to Romania after 1914 will have to leave, as will all the Jews in the liberated 
territories without exception. Jews in the Old Kingdom who came here before 1914 will be  
allowed to stay provided they abide by the laws of our national state. But the Communists, as well as 
those who engage in subversive propaganda or join forces with the country‟s enemy, and all those  who 
in one way or another try to sabotage the interests of the state and the Romanian people-all those will 
have to leave.  
  We decided to defend our Romanian rights because our all-too-tolerant past was  taken advantage  of 
by the Jews and facilitated the abuse of our rights by foreigners, particularly the Jews…We are 
determined to put an end to this situation. We cannot afford to put in jeopardy the existence of our 
nation because of several hundred thousand Jews, or in order to salvage some principle of humane 
democracy that has not been understood properly.”103  
 
 A few days before the outbreak of war Antonescu sent an informal resolution to the 
Ministry of Propaganda demanding that “all the Jewish-communist coffee houses in 
Moldavia are to be shut down, the names of all Jewish and communist agents or 
sympathizers are to be listed (by county). The Ministry of Interior is to restrict their freedom 
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of movement, so as to ensure that the Ministry will be able to execute further orders to be 
given by me concerning them, when the suitable time comes.”104  Three days before the 
outbreak of the war, Ion Antonescu ordered the deportation within forty-eight hours of Jews 
from villages and townships in Romania itself, and the incarceration of men, and sometimes 
also women and children in camps in the south of the country. 
105
 On 21 June, acting on 
Antonescu‟s special orders, the Romanian Secret Service, the SSI, set up a special unit 
modeled after the Einsatzgruppen. Antonescu issued Ordonance No. 4147, directing that all 
Jews between the ages of eighteen and sixty years who resided in the villages between the 
Siret and Prut rivers be evacuated to the Targu Jiu camp in the South of Romania; the first 
trains were to leave on exactly June 21. Members of the families of those deported were 
evacuated to several towns. A time-limit of forty eight hours was set for the execution for 
this operation: “It is a military principle that the population in the area of the front must be 
moved.”106 On the afternoon of June 26, the leaders of the Jewish community of Iasi were 
ordered to present themselves at the Chestura, the central headquarters of the Iasi police, 
where they were told that the Jews of Iasi were guilty of collaborating with “downed Jewish 
Soviet pilots.”107 This determined the context for the Iasi pogrom. The nature of Antonescu‟s 
nationalistic policies is explicitly presented when he emphasizes the main reason for 
expropriation of the Jews and the cooperation with German: “the permanent interests of our 
living space (spatial nostru vital).”108 Between 10,000 and 12,000 Jews lost their lives in Iasi, 
most within one day-June 29-and the remainder during their transport in freight cars. These 
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became death chambers and were in fact called death trains. Romanian civilian and military 
authorities supplied the pretext for the pogrom. They accused the Jews of having signaled to 
Soviet planes that carried out bombing raids against the city and then having opened fire 
from their homes on Romanian and German soldiers stationed there, inflicting losses. 
 In general, Antonescu maintained he did now know what was going on in Iasi: “At 
the time the massacre was taking place in Iasi, I was at the front in south Moldova and 
afterward I went to Iasi.”109 Later on, he added that he knew only about 2,000 Jews who had 
been packed into freight cars at the railroad station in town and subsequently died of 
suffocation inside.  Nevertheless, it is without doubt that Antonescu‟s previous policies 
induced this conflict. In the case of the Iasi pogrom, there was a combination of traditions 
long-time anti-Semitic, terror spread by the military operations, official anti-Semitic 
propaganda and the manipulations organized by SSI (Serviciul Special de Information, the 
Special Information Service), which made the Jewish population of Iasi an easy target for the 
pogromists.”110  
 However, Antonescu realized that in order to purify the nation, he needed to start a 
process of ethnic cleansing. It is difficult to predict whether he could have been acquitted had 
Hitler or the Nazis not been anti-Semitic. Nevertheless, as seen in the previous years, the 
context mattered for the governments. Their policies were largely reactionary to the events in 
Europe. But in fact, the implications of these events were crucial for the domestic politics. 
The first crucial stage of the specific cleansing process was not finalized until August 1941. 
At least 150,000 Jews were murdered on Antonescu‟s orders. According to Mihai Antonescu, 
the objective was to carry out ethnic and political cleansing in Bessarabia and Bukovina. At 
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the conference in Bucharest of the administration heads of the areas in question, Mihai 
Antonescu outlined the next stages of the operation and said that steps must be “taken toward 
forced emigration of the Jewish element, in particular and foreign elements in general.”111 On 
July 11, he issued a secret directive to the governor of Bessarabia, General Voiculescu, in 
which he demanded “the Jews be put under a regime which would suit their acts and attitudes 
during the ceding of Bessarabia…to the Soviets.”112 On July 18, he issued an order to “put to 
work at hard labor all the Jews in labor and detention camps. In case of escape one out of ten 
must be shot. If they don‟t work properly they must be denied food and now allowed to 
receive food or to buy it.”113 Early in August 1941, Antonescu demanded that the SSI take a 
census of the Jews incarcerated in the camps and forward the figure to Mihai Antonescu. The 
deportation commenced on 6 September 1941, and proceeded more or less to Antonescu‟s 
satisfaction with the exception of criminal acts by the soldiers and attacks by Romanian 
peasants on Jews in the convoys. In fact, socially, these policies had an extremely negative 
impact, paving the way to a great number of crimes. In Bessarabia, for example local 
residents used to buy Jews from the gendarmes for 2,000 lei in order to get their clothes after 
the soldier shot them. On October 6, at a government meeting, Antonescu summed up the 
operation to cleanse Bessarabia of Jews:  
 As for the Jews, I decided to remove all of them once for all from these areas. The operation is going 
on. There are still some 10,000 Jews left in Bessarbia, and they too will be moved across the Dniester 
within several days. If circumstances allow me, they will be moved across the Ural Mountains.”
114
 
 
 Politically, the deportations involved a series of changes within the government. 
“Since some of the deportees were transported aboard trains, the Ministry of Transportation 
also had to be involved in the deportations, and the Railroad Authority was therefore placed 
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under the jurisdiction of the General Staff in order to facilitate the conduct of the war.”115 
The practical aspects of the deportations were discussed not at government meetings but in 
Order Council and with other ministers whose areas of jurisdiction had a bearing on the 
matter. At the postwar trial of Romanian war criminals, one of the former ministers said that 
the Council “did not discuss the deportations in the sense of decisions, proposals, or 
debates.”116 Antonescu alone was responsible for these matters. 
 In essence, Antonescu‟s attitude towards the Jews alternated.  He even compared the 
policies with a war against the Jews:  
The fight is bitter. It is a fight to life or death. It is a fight between us and the Germans, on the one hand, 
and the Jews, on the other…I shall undertake a work of complete cleansing, of Jews and of all others 
who have snuck up on us…Had we not started this war, to cleanse our race of these people who sap our 
economic, national, and physical life, we would be cursed with complete disappearance…Consequently, 
our policy in this regard is to achieve a homogenous whole in Bessarabia, Bukovina, Moldavia, and…in 
Transylvania.
117
 
 
 But in September 1941, Antonescu told Filderman that he would rescind the order forcing 
Jews in Romania to wear the Star of David, allow Jews to emigrate to Spain or Portugal, and 
not deport the Jews of Moldavia and Wallachia.
118
 In 1942 however, he signed the April 
1942 order to deport the remaining 425 Jews of Bessarabia to Transnistria. It was his 
decision to carry out the second deportation of Jews from Bukovina, formally enacted on 28 
May 1942.
119
  
 There is no doubt that Antonescu cared about the image of Romania abroad, especially 
after the events of Stalingrad. Reports from the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
asserted that Romanian Jews under Nazi occupation were treated worse than Hungarian 
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Jews; this simply annoyed Antonescu. During his trial, he claimed that the deportation was 
actually intended to save the allegedly pro-communist Jews from the population‟s wrath and 
that he could state with certainty that had he not dispatched them to Transnistria, none of 
them would have survived. He repeatedly emphasized that deportations were based upon 
military security reasons and for their own safety. It is without a doubt that Antonescu‟s 
name has been rehabilitated in the scholar and political circles in Romania since 1989 
because of his anti-Sovietism. However, if that were the real explanation of the deportations 
of the Jews and not an extreme hatred against minorities, nationalism would still be the main 
impetus. Hitler and Nazism simply cannot be considered fundamental and decisive. The main 
proof is in Antonescu‟s variation in terms of policy-making decisions.   
 
 
3.2. The Increasing Focus on the Roma  
  
 The political interest in the Romani population had been relatively weak in the pre-
1918 era. The lack of previous integrative measures after abolition of any forms of slavery
120
 
in Romania negatively impacted this particular ethnic group. Most of the Roma population 
did not manage to find a “good” and stable way of living and a good number went back to 
their owners, offering themselves for sale. It is believed that this situation heavily affected 
their demographic dynamics, leading to a nomadic life and on inability to have a secure form 
of income.
121
  The First World War and the peace treaties led to the growth of the number of 
minorities to over 18% (28% of the total population), out of which 133,000 were ethnic 
Roma (0.8% out of total population). As Irina Livezeanu and Maria Bucur emphasize, the 
enlarged Romanian state suffered through a series of anxieties manifested in growing 
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ethnonationalism at an institutional and policy level during the interwar period.
122
 In essence, 
the Romani population was vital to Romanian ethnonational identity. According to the 1930 
census, 262,051 people declared themselves to be of Gypsy descent and many had the status 
of Romanian peasants.  In a state that was mainly focused on creating a unitary state and on 
socio-economic development along the lines of nationalism, the Roma population found 
itself diminished. The authorities believed that Roma did not have the same rights as the 
other minorities, because they did not have a written culture and history.
123
 Even more so, 
they were treated as a social category, which led to inapplicability of minority legislation.  
For example, The General Commissariat for Minorities (Comisariatul General al 
Minoritatilor), established in 1938, never considered the Roma within the scope of its 
jurisdiction.  
   After coming to power, the Legionary movement was the first to consider adopting a 
racial policy toward the Roma. The Legion journal Cuvantul published an article on 18 
January 1941 that stressed the “priority of the Gypsy issue” on the government agenda and 
suggested that appropriate legislation be passed to make marriages between Romanians and 
Roma illegal and to gradually isolate the Roma into ghettos.
124
 Finally, it can be argued that 
the violent pro-Romanian fascism led by Codreanu and the Iron Guard peaked under 
Antonescu, when the Romani population became a national “problem” for the first time. 
 Antonescu‟s idea to deport Roma to Transnistria was only conceived after Romania 
obtained Transnistria, as a step toward national purification. The biological racialization of 
the Holocaust emphasized the concerns vis-à-vis the Romani population.  The 1942 census 
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validated the newly found “problem” status of the Roma population. Antonescu saw the 
nomadic Roma and those sedentary Roma with criminal records, recidivists, and those with 
no means of subsistence particularly problematic. A total of 40,909 individuals were 
registered on these lists: 9,471 nomadic Roma and 31,438 sedentary Roma. The order of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs of 17 May 1942 stated that the Roma on the list were to be kept 
under close surveillance by local authorities and prevented from leaving the country until 
further instruction.  The decree that specifically ordered the census emphasized that the 
population targeted was the “sedentary nomads (especially those who, being non-nomadic, 
are convicts, recidivists, or have no means of existence or precise occupation from which to 
live honestly through work, and thus constitute a burden and a danger to public order).”125 
The previous confusion in relation to their political status led to the inability of the 
Gendarmerie to pinpoint this specific group. Therefore, a census of “all sedentary Gypsies 
who have had prior convictions, are recidivists, or live without a means of existence”126 was 
created. Finally, on August 15, the General Inspectorate of the Gendarmerie ordered the 
return of the censuses of “convicted, dangerous, etc. gypsies” by the following day.127  
 The subsequent deportation consisted of the Roma registered in this census.   
The total number of Roma deported to Transnistria from June 1942 to December 1943 
reached slightly over 25,000. In early October 1942, after both major deportations, there 
were 24,686 Roma in Transnistria: 11,441 were nomadic, 13,176 were sedentary, and 
another sixty-nine had been deported after having been released from prison.
128
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 The growing importance of the Roma proves that policies against minorities reached a 
major point. Discourses of social integration or assimilation had been relatively non-existent 
when it came to the Jewish population. The evolution of political discrimination and 
subsequent segregation of the Romani population generally demonstrate that Romania had 
become a racial state and its engine was Antonescu‟s hypernationalist policies towards 
homogenization.  
 
3.3. Hungarians and the Failure of the Policy Exchange 
 
 With the racialization of ethnicity becoming more central, the minorities with specific 
kin-states seemed relatively safe. That is not to say that Antonescu did not attempt to remove 
the rest of the ethnicities out of Romania. Perhaps the boldest program was drafted by 
demographer and “scientist” Sabin Manuila. His project entailed a comprehensive population 
exchange, a systematic and aggressive demographic policy. On 15 October 1941 Manuila 
presented the project to Ion Antonescu. He believed that this project was worth undertaking 
because it was largely an alternative to potential wars with neighbors. He believed that 
“Hungarians are as fanatical as [Romanians are],” and thus, it would be likely to be a war of 
extermination. He further emphasized that the return of Transylvania would have to be 
accompanied by a population exchange between the two countries if a stable settlement was 
to be pursued.
129
  The exchanges were to be based on the borders of Greater Romania (1918-
1940) and not those of 1941. According to him, revision would restore most of the territory 
                                                        
129
 “Manuila Plan.” 609. In Vladimir Solonari, “An Important New Document on the Romanian Policy of 
Ethnic Cleansing During World War II,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2007). 
49 
 
Romania had lost in 1940.
130
 All in all, Manuila‟s plan aimed for the removal of 3,581,618 
non-ethnic Romanians from the country and bringing in of 1,979,059 “Romanians by blood” 
from surrounding countries.
131
  
 The plan materialized only to a minor degree, entailing the repatriation of part of the 
Hungarian-speaking population from Moldova. However, the influence of this program in 
Antonescu‟s policies seems to have been minimal. Firstly, the plan was simply not realistic. 
Secondly, as Solonari argues, Manuila failed to take into consideration the ambitions of the 
Conducator, who besides homogenization of the population, also aimed at the territorial 
annexation of Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina and Northern Transylvania. He even had plans 
to annex Transnistria to Romania.
132
  Antonescu‟s acute xenophobia, racialization of 
ethnicity and the pervasive existence of a national ideal of homogeneity led, in the end, to a 
prioritization of removal of the Jews and Roma and less of a concern vis-à-vis Hungarian 
population.  
 
 
 Ion Antonescu post-1989 portrayals as a great patriot are not surprising. It can be 
argued that, indeed, Antonescu had a vision for Romania. In fact, it seems that his personal 
political interests had a secondary role when it came to controlling the minority population. 
Nevertheless, his patriotism was extreme and even culpable. The policies of segregation or 
pure elimination in the case of the Jewish and Romani populations were largely stemmed in 
previous attempts of homogenization. The European context definitely helped Antonescu in 
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partially achieving his plans. But the lack of continuity of his campaign, as seen in the halting 
of the deportation of the Jews in 1942, demonstrates that he also focused on his image 
abroad. Germany was losing the war, so the ties with Hitler had to be loosened, in order to 
maintain a level of international legitimization, but also to save Romania from collapse. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 The Communist Period and Erratic Fluctuation of Minority Policies: 1945-1989 
 
 
 At the end of World War II, Romania found itself in a rather precarious position. 
Geographically the situation had changed, albeit not to the same extent as after World War I. 
Politically, however, the change had extreme consequences, as the Soviets had taken over the 
country in a relatively short period of time. Politically, Romania switched from an orientation 
of extreme right to extreme left.  However, nationalism remained a constant in terms of 
shaping minority policies. During the communist period, I argue that minority policies were 
determined by the necessity of the newly formed communist government to gain legitimacy, 
create alliances and critically centralize political power. This approach towards minorities 
allowed for a peculiar manifestation of a national ideology under communism. Considering 
these elements, the dilemma is in the degree of influence and the pressure of the external 
powers, particularly Moscow, before and after the withdrawal of the Red Army in 1958. I 
argue that, once again, the international pressure was relatively minimal in the relationship 
between the Romanian state and its minorities. The erratic fluctuation between policies of 
integration and segregation lead to the theory that, in fact, domestic political interest played 
the main role in policy drafting. The following section will discuss these particular 
approaches to minority policies in the communist period and how they determined the 
development of a particular Romanian identity under a socialist regime. 
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4.1. From neo-stalinism to nationalist communism 
In the immediate post-1945 period, we can see a switch in approach concerning 
national minorities. The political discourse changed from the emphasis on full elimination of 
some ethnic minorities to a focus on integration. The new government led by Petru Groza 
was to be a leftist government that initiated a positive approach. The communists needed the 
minorities to be their allies, in order to strengthen their newly achieved power in Romania. 
Nevertheless, from an ideological standpoint, the arrival of communism also meant a more 
prominent focus on “stateness” and less on “nationness.”133 Also, nationalism and 
communism are ideologically in conflict. The underlying question is how much of the 
relationship with minorities was imposed from Moscow in the early stages and how much 
was a domestic or self-interested political impetus. The erratic process of decision-making in 
the first half of communist rule, the development of nationalist communism and the 
emergence of the cult of personality during Ceausescu‟s rule points to the fact that in 
Romania internal factors once again had the strongest role behind minority policies. While 
communist ideology played a substantial role in the policy framework in the first part of its 
rule, the Communist Party ultimately needed alliances from minorities that had been 
persecuted by previous rightist nationalists. 
 It is without doubt that on the theoretical level, in the early days of communist rule, 
particularly in the period between 1947 and 1956, Romania was influenced by ideas of 
“Socialist patriotism.” This was extensively based on Stalin‟s theses on national identities. 
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The strength of Soviet patriotism -- said Comrade Stalin -- lies in the fact that it is based not on 
 racial or  nationalist prejudices, but on the people's profound loyalty and devotion to their Soviet 
 Motherland, on the fraternal partnership of the working people of all the nationalities in our 
 country. Soviet patriotism harmoniously combines the national traditions of the peoples and the 
 common vital interests of all the working people of the Soviet Union.
134
  
 
 I describe this approach as being neo-stalinist. Thus, the new Romanian socialist state 
focused heavily on acquiring legitimacy through cultural and socio-economic communist 
values. Minority policies became part of this process particularly in the first half of the 
communist era.  
 Scholars generally agree that national ideology played a crucial role during the 
second half of Ceausescu‟s dictatorship. It has been argued that he extensively used it for the 
development of his cult of personality. Social anthropologist Katherine Verdery, in fact, 
emphasizes that national rhetoric and focus on language and culture contributed heavily to 
the symbolic force of the particular ideology put into practice by Nicolae Ceausescu.
135
 
Verdery, however, argues that nationalism was not one of Ceausescu‟s strategies to 
legitimate his rule and to keep “the intellectuals coopted or subservient.”136 In fact, she notes 
that the Party was “forced onto the terrain of national values (not unwillingly) under pressure 
from others, especially intellectuals, who it could fully engage in no other manner(…) 
Romanian intellectuals were utilizing something-the Nation-that we might call a master 
symbolic, one having the capacity to dominate the field of symbols and discourses in which it 
was employed, pressing the meanings of other terms and symbols in its own direction.”137 
She also adds: “National discourse in Romania is more than something used instrumentally 
by the Communist party but as rather, inscribed in and emanating from many quarters of 
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Romanian society.”138 There is no doubt that the Romanian intelligentsia was, indeed, a 
strong force in coercing Party national discourse. Nevertheless, the intelligentsia could have 
not used its rhetoric without a favorable context. The minority policies created this 
framework. They simply did not allow any forms of mobilization that could have affected 
Romanian national identity. By eliminating the foreign factor, either by assimilation or 
segregation, Romanian governments allowed the successful spread of national ideology in 
rhetoric. It is fair to assume that national symbols could not have had the same impact in a 
state plagued by ethnic conflicts. Thus, both liberalization and coercion of minorities played 
a significant role in the evolution of national ideology in Romania. 
 
4.2. Erratic Policies towards Hungarians 
 
In the post-war period, Hungarians became, once again, the center of attention for the 
newly formed government.  The Hungarian population was, in fact, the most prominent, 
leading to serious political concern. I am tracing a number of crucial policies that affected the 
Hungarian population directly. 
139 
 Hungarians were immediately targeted in the initial stages of a somewhat populist 
approach of the Government that came to power in 1944, the immediate post-Antonescu era. 
There was a necessity for alliances with minorities for the Communist Party, because it was a 
relatively small party in the immediate post-war period. This led to an official collaboration 
between the Popular Magyar Union (Uniunea Populara Maghiara/UPM) and the Romanian 
Communist Party (PCR). The principles included in the collaboration between the UPM and 
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PCR were: representation in the government, self-government in areas in which the Magyar 
population was above fifty percent, the recognition of Hungary as an official language, 
public education in Hungarian from primary school to universities, equality in rights of the 
Churches (Hungarian and Romanian Orthodox), the maintaining of Hungarian cultural 
institutions and freedom to use national symbols without restrictions.
140
 Furthermore, the 
state would support schools, kindergartens and community centers. In essence the Hungarian 
community was not integrated as a result of acceptance of ethnic individualism-either 
administrative or cultural, but based on its status as a functioning community within the 
Romanian space. In the end, it was a matter of integration that would have served the 
political purposes of the Party and not a matter of concern for the Hungarians and their socio-
political status at that time. From the perspective of the Magyar population, there was a 
necessity for normalization of the minority status in the post-war period. Hence, a series of 
Magyar leaders started collaboration with the Communist Party. The preferred collective 
solution led to the elaboration of a document on the Status of National Minorities.
141
   
 Once the Communist ensured their relative legitimacy, the heads of the UPM and 
their minority collaborators were heavily investigated under the accusation of fraud or 
treason against the state. In May 1947, the year when the PCR fully seized power, a new 
campaign of Romanianization reminiscent of the interwar period began. Autonomous 
economic institutions were eliminated, and starting with 1947-1948 traveling in Hungary 
became almost impossible. In 1952, the Autonomous Hungarian Region was created and the 
UPM ended its activity in 1953. Furthermore, nationalization was the central policy between 
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1948 and 1956. It had massive consequences on the policies concerning minorities as well, as 
it led to a progressive destruction of the Hungarian community.  For example, according to 
the Governmental Decree 176 from 1948, 1593 schools were subjected to nationalization. 
81.6% were confessional Magyar schools. Furthermore, the decision no. 150/1950 of the 
Ministry of Culture and 2698/1952 of Ministry of Internal Affairs elaborated the confiscation 
of the archives or the nationalization of culture groups (e.g. Cultural Complex Batthyaneum 
in Alba Iulia).
142
 At this stage, Magyars were deprived of the possibilities to maintain their 
national identity.  
 The 1956 Hungarian Revolution was a key moment in the relationship between the 
state and the Hungarian minority. If in the first periods of the communist regime we can 
discuss about concern for legitimacy and power strengthening, the centralized control over 
the Hungarian community developed heavily in 1956. The sympathies between Romania‟s 
Hungarian community and the ideals of the Hungarian Revolution were interpreted by the 
Romanian regime as nationalist manifestations against the state. When political dissent 
emerged and the Hungarian intelligentsia in Transylvania started organizing anti-communist 
activities, thousands of protesters were arrested and incarcerated.
143
 The unrest was blamed 
on a series of bad policies concerning the minorities. The fact that most protesters were 
young people led to the conclusion that the existence of institutions where teaching in the 
mother tongue was allowed was a great policy mistake. Ultimately, the teaching of 
Hungarian language in high schools was restricted.
144
 Even more so, minimum quotas for 
number of students in a class were imposed; but even when these were met, classes were 
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cancelled.
145
 Furthermore the Hungarian-speaking University, Bolyai University, and the 
Romanian Babes University were forced to merge in 1959. Consequently, the number of 
subjects that could be studied in Hungarian decreased considerably at the level of higher 
education.
146
 In essence, the only career opportunities for Magyars were in teaching and 
medicine.
147 
 When Nicolae Ceausescu was elected as the First Secretary of the Central Committee 
of PCR in 1965, a new stage of the communist period began. This was an episode of 
relaxation and, ironically, of liberalization concerning the policy towards minorities. 
However, it can be argued that there was a clear dichotomy when it came to political 
discourse and actions in relation to the Magyars. On the surface, it was assumed and even 
promoted that, in fact, the nationality issues had been solved. The cultural concessions were 
astounding: Hungarian magazines started publishing, Hungarian language newspapers 
appeared in counties with a predominant Hungarian population. The Hungarian elites were 
also consistently attracted in Ceausescu‟s circles of interest. Ultimately, minority rights 
would gradually diminish, as Ceausescu‟s focus was to turn Romania into a personal 
dictatorship. However, in the 1965 Constitution, the term nationalitate conlocuitoare or “co-
existing nationality” was added. Article 22 showed that the government allowed the use of 
the mother tongue in books, newspapers, magazines, theater or within the education system. 
The media also began playing an important role, as the government allowed the opening of 
publishing houses and broadcasting of television shows in Hungarian. Language rights were 
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to be kept as part of a policy of integration.
148
  However, at the beginning of the 1970s, the 
situation of the minorities gradually worsened. There is a consensus that Romania became a 
nationalist communist state between 1971
149
  and 1989.   
 After Ceausescu‟s July Theses in 1971, a speech on “Proposed measures or the 
improvement of political ideological activity, of the Marxist-Leninist education of Party 
members, of all working people, “ an unprecedented period of radical re-stalinization and the 
construction of a personality cult without precedent followed. In 1968 Romania had 
distanced itself from Moscow by refusing to support the military suppression of the 
Revolution in Prague. Ties were maintained based only on the common communist ideology. 
This allowed Ceausescu to create an iron curtain between Romania and the rest of the USSR. 
Interestingly enough, the ties with the West reversed, as he became a favorite of the Western 
leaders. Nevertheless, the practice of dictatorship was extremely prominent in this period. 
For the Hungarian population, severe travel restrictions were imposed.
150
 Hungarians 
attempted to cross the guarded border into Hungary, but they were often arrested and charged 
with disloyalty or attempted subversion against the state.
151
 The process of assimilation 
determined the creation of forced policies: Hungarian schools and departments were reduced 
in number, Hungarian publications were put under ideological censorship, broadcast of local 
radio stations in Hungarian was stopped, geographical and Christian names in the native 
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language were prohibited, and villages began to be demolished, an initiative that Hungarians 
perceived as being aimed at them.
152
 Perhaps the strongest policies of assimilation refer to 
education, such as Decree No. 278/1973 issued by the Romanian State Council on 13 May 
1973: “in townships where primary schools offer instruction in the languages of cohabiting 
nationalities, (…) sections or classes taught in Romanian shall be organized, irrespective of 
the number of students.(…) the minimum number of children in a class shall be at least 25 in 
primary school classes [for minorities] and 36 in secondary school classes for minorities.”153 
Restrictions culminated with the closing of the Hungarian Consulate in Cluj in 1988 after a 
diplomatic scandal. By the end of the 1980s the “co-existing nationalities” were replaced by 
“Romanians of Hungarian language.”154 
 
4.3. Migration of Germans 
In the post-1945 period, Romania did not expel Germans, unlike Poland or Hungary. 
However, 70,000 ethnic male Germans had been deported to labor camps in Ukraine and 
approximately 100,000 fled with the German army. The German community, however, 
remained relatively intact. Furthermore, in the immediate post-war period, the liberal 
minority policies used for Hungarians were extensively used for the German population also: 
access to mother-tongue education, their own weekly press and book publication, cultural 
programmes, and airtime for German-language radio and television broadcasts.
155
 At the 
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same time, nationalization affected the German population to a similar extent as the 
Hungarian population.  Nationalization led the mostly rural German population to  
poverty. 
156
   
 When Ceausescu signaled the departure from multiculturalism in the early 1970s, the 
Germans were also affected, however, not nearly as severely as the Hungarian population. 
Germans continued to enjoy a relative freedom of expression of their 
ethnocultural identity. Historian Stefan Wolff argues that, this was connected to the fact that, 
the Romanian communist regime had discovered that its German minority was a source of 
hard-currency income. The regime also wanted to benefit from Willy Brandt‟s neue 
Ostpolitik, as over 150,000 ethnic Germans were given exit visas to the federal Republic 
between 1977 and 1988, against a per-capita fee of between 8,000 and 12,000 
Deutschmarks.
157
  All post-war censuses show a decline in the number of ethnic Germans in 
Romania largely because of the profit incentives that triggered the government to let 
Germans leave.
158
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In essence, there were a series of factors that led to the migration-oriented policies: the small 
German population could not have a big role within the state. There were not dangerous 
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either, as seen in the case of the Hungarians. Like in many of the countries in Eastern Europe, 
the economic situation was difficult. When Germany offered the possibility of this exchange, 
the government embraced it. 
 
4.4. Early Policies of Inclusion and the Migration of the Jews 
 
 After the Holocaust, there were approximately 400,000 Jews in Romania. By 1977, as 
a result of mass emigration, approximately 20,000 remained.  
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The status of the post-war Jewish population rested heavily on restitution policies. It was a 
way for the population to go back to normality after the Antonescu era. However, 
nationalization delayed return of houses and other Jewish-owned property. As was the case 
with the other minorities, this state policy affected a large number of Jewish entrepreneurs. 
Consequently, Romania found itself dealing with a mass exodus to Israel. Emigration would, 
in fact, lessen the risk of ethnic conflict. However, the authorities prevented the departure of 
educated persons or those who could have contributed to the new socialist economy. 
Opinions were divided on the emigration issue leading to the regime‟s shifting policy vis-à-
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vis the exodus of the Jewish population.
159
 The interests of the Party managed however to 
offer an unprecedented set of privileges: ability to enter the Communist Party and have 
important positions at a local or administrative level. There was not a policy of aggressive 
segregation.
160
  
 However, due to the halting of the emigration policy between 1952 and 1956, 
Romania had to deal with a form of social anti-Semitism. In essence, the Jews were, once 
again, accused of spreading communism and communist values. In this context, the Party re-
strategized its ethnic composition at the beginning of the 1950s, as the Jews were removed 
from political life. The community entered a period of marginalization.
161 
 Improvement in the relations between Romania and Israel led to a change of status of 
the Jewish community. It is not a matter of Israeli pressure however, as it generally refrained 
from interfering in Romanian domestic policies, but a matter of economic concerns that had 
appeared even before Ceausescu took power. The economic benefits of an association with 
Israel and the United States were appealing to the governments of the time.
162
 The opening of 
borders followed and a great number of the Jewish population fled to Israel. As Romanian-
born Jewish mathematician Egon Balas described it, the Jews, “who had been traditionally 
discriminated against, now had an enormous privilege and advantage over non-Jews in that 
they could apply to emigrate.”163   
 Ceausescu‟s liberal policy on Jewish emigration was appreciated extensively at an 
international level. Historian Leon Volovici argues that these open policies would have 
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influenced the greater spread of national ideology, since the population was to be far more 
homogeneous as a result of these exoduses.
164
 The Jewish population was massively crippled 
after the war and despite a series of policies that might have emphasized its definite role on a 
political level the community was far too weak to pose any real threats to the regime, unlike 
the Hungarian population. On the contrary, it offered unexpected benefits, which Ceausescu 
ultimately took advantage of. Paradoxically, the Jews and the Germans had the same status 
within Romania which led to similar policies. 
 
4.5. The status of the Roma 
 
 During the war, the Roma became an important focus for the Romanian racist state. 
However, their deportation was not seriously considered in the discourses of the communist 
leaders. The previous anti-Semitic and anti-Jewish policies were of greater importance to the 
communists.  In fact, the Roma were not categorized as either a social or ethnic priority for 
the authorities. They were not discussed in relation to postwar minority policies. 
Furthermore, they were not mentioned in the policy towards “co-inhabiting nationalities.”165 
Roma were first considered a minority during the war, but were highly neglected as such 
before and after. Nevertheless, there was a preoccupation with the Roma, especially in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, when a program that focused on social integration was launched. 
We can only assume that its quick abandonment was related to the inability or lack of interest 
in acknowledging them as ethnic minorities.  
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 Minority policies during the communist period were triggered by a combination of 
previous causes. The internal engines were a mix of attempts for nation-building, 
centralization of power and economic interests. While the first half of the communist period 
had an ideological basis framed by the Soviet Union and generally controlled from Moscow, 
the need for domestic support of the relatively weak communist party in the early years 
cannot be ignored. However, the year 1968 played a definite role in the relationship between 
Romania and the rest of the USSR. Subsequently, Ceausescu “blocked” the country creating 
the perfect framework for a manifestation of an extreme national ideology. These elements 
reflected largely on the evolution of the minority policies, which heavily fluctuated between 
liberalization and constraints.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Postcommunist Period and The Struggle for Legitimacy: 1989-2007  
 
 
 
 Scholars have extensively debated the involvement of the EU in the development of 
new democracies in Eastern Europe. Political scientist Laurence Whitehead emphasized the 
powerful impact of EU accession by stating that the organization: 
 
…generates powerful, broad-based and long-term support for the establishment of democratic 
institutions because it is irreversible, and sets in train a cumulative process of economic and political 
integration that offers incentives and reassurances to a very wide array of social  forces…it sets in 
motion a very complete and profound set of mutual adjustment processes, both within the incipient 
democracy and its interactions with the rest of the Community, nearly all of which tend to favor 
democratic consolidation…166 
 
 While the main idea of this argument is valid, one should not assume that the process 
of democratization would have external impetuses only. In the case of Romania and its 
minorities, one cannot ignore the resources for democratization that came from within. This 
aspect argues against Martin Brusis‟ positive rating of the impact exerted by the EU on 
shared power between ethnicities.
167
 A look at the patterns of impetuses for minority policies 
in Romanian history also demonstrates a prevalence of internal factors and reactionary 
attitudes to external contexts. While the role of the EU in the drafting of the minority policies 
cannot be ignored, it should not be assumed that it was singular or decisive. In fact, the 
internal coordinates of these policies were maintained throughout the post-communist period. 
 The main concern of Romanian citizens in the aftermath of the Ceausescu regime was 
how to create a strong, lasting democracy based on political pluralism and social acceptance. 
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In this context, a great point of interest was how to transform an ethnic state, with a tradition 
of xenophobic fascism and nationalist communism, into a civic state. During the revolution 
of December 1989,
168
 a number of reformed communists formed the National Salvation 
Front (NSF) and assumed the majority of political responsibilities. It has been argued 
however that their communist heritage slowed the process of democratization in the 
beginning, nationalism and centralization of power playing an important role between 1990 
and 1996. The political change came in 1996 when the rightist Romanian Democratic 
Convention (CDR) won the electoral majority, what some have called part of the second 
wave of democratization in the past communist region.
169
 The main characteristic of this new 
government was the use of an openness policy. If the government of the early years of the 
transition period showed a centralized focus on internal affairs, often dismissing the 
intervention of the European Community, the CDR opened towards the West, emphasizing 
integration in the EU and NATO. The economic, political and social incentives proposed by 
the European Community determined a series of changes at the domestic level. Hence, I 
argue that the EU did not impose direct pressure when it comes to policies vis-à-vis 
minorities.
170
 The socio-economic and political goals became the main catalyst for post-1996 
governments to insure minority rights. This chapter focuses on the early post-communist 
nationalism, ideals of democratization and European institutional integration as the main 
impetuses for minority policies in post-communist Romania.  
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5.1. Early Internal Changes and the Status of the Hungarians 
 
 
 The remains of Ceausescu‟s nationalist communism survived to a great extent in the 
early transition period.  Former members of the communist party mostly formed the National 
Salvation Front, the party that took over power in Romania in 1990. They have often been 
called “reformed communists.” In this context, the implications for minorities were vague. 
The Romanian government further focused on centralization, albeit moderate, drawing 
criticism from both the international community and from internal opposition. Nevertheless 
Ion Iliescu, the new president realized that the state needed legitimacy both internally and 
externally.  In fact, it can be argued that the relationship between the government and the 
Hungarian population emphasized both the nationalist character of the state and the need for 
internal and external legitimacy. The first step in separating from communist policies 
towards minorities was the acknowledgment of the role of the Hungarian minority in the 
1989 Revolution. Thus, the government started offering more rights, a stimulus to internal 
legitimacy.
171
 An element that was to be considered in the drafting of the new policy frame 
was the fact that the Hungarian minority sparked the Timisoara events, the initial riot of the 
revolution. The Hungarian bishop Laszlo Tokes, an outspoken critic of the Ceausescu 
regime, was the central figure of this riot. The Securitate attempted to move him to a less 
prominent parish, but he refused to leave and on 17 December 1989 the police undertook an 
action to evict him from his house. This incident sparked riots in Timisoara leading to a 
general uprising in other areas of the country. In fact, in four days, genuine anti-communist 
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demonstrations spread to Bucharest, throwing the country in a bloody revolution that led to 
the fall of the regime change.
172
 
 When the Ceausescu regime fell, the newly formed NSF created a ten-point program 
on 22 December, a first hint of openness towards minority rights. The document was a plan 
for democratization. 
173
 The first point of the program emphasized the establishment of 
political pluralism.
174
  Another major point was point nine of the program, in which 
European integration and positive collaboration with neighboring countries become a clear 
interest of foreign policy.
175
  
 With the relationship between Romania and its neighboring countries becoming a 
major point in the process of early institutional democratization, Hungary played an 
interesting and unexpected role. Hungary was, in fact, the first state to recognize the new 
government on 23 December 1989. The goal was, primarily, to diminish the perception that 
Hungary still harbored territorial claims against Romania.
176
  In essence, the shaping of 
policy towards the Hungarian minority in the early days of the transition period was heavily 
influenced by the relationship with Hungary, as it promoted democratic legitimacy and 
openness in foreign policy. On 11 January 1990 the countries signed a trade agreement, 
which stipulated the removal of restrictions on the sale of Hungarian books and newspapers 
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in Romania.
177
 Furthermore, Budapest had agreed to provide for the educational needs of the 
minority in Romania. These events contextualized the signing of declaration on the status of 
the national minorities in Romania. The NSF released this declaration on 5 January 1990, 
emphasizing the importance of the Hungarian involvement in the revolution and the open 
approach concerning the neighborly relations: 
 
The revolution in Romania, an historic act of the entire people, of the Romanian nation and of the 
national minorities, attests to the unity and solidarity of all the homeland‟s sons who have wished 
freedom and authentic democracy. The bloodshed in common has shown that the policy of hate-
mongering based on a chauvinistic policy of forced assimilation as well as the successive attempts  to 
defame neighboring Hungary and the Hungarians in Romania, could not succeed in breaking the 
confidence, friendship and unity between the Romanian people and the national minorities. 
The National Salvation Front solemnly declares that it shall achieve and guarantee the individual and 
collective rights and liberties of all the national minorities.
178
 
 
 The declaration also emphasized that a Ministry of National Minorities would be 
created in order to “provide the appropriate institutional framework for the exercise of the 
minorities‟ major rights, the use of their mother tongues, and the promotion of the national 
culture and the safeguarding of ethnic identity.”179 This was, in fact, a strong addendum to 
the process of integration that had also been laid down through a law on local government. 
This decree emphasized that in areas of Romania inhabited by ethnic minorities, the mother 
language would be used in framing the decisions of the local state. Broadcasting in 
Hungarian (and German) was resumed, and radio stations from Bucharest and in the bigger 
cities of Transylvania had approximately twelve hours a week of transmissions in Hungarian. 
A process of restoring teaching in Hungarian in Targu Mures and Cluj, cities with a large 
Hungarian population, also emerged. However, despite a positive approach towards minority 
rights, the social implications were relatively negative in the early period of the 1990s. 
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 On 15 March 1990 the Hungarian population in Targu Mures replaced Romanian 
flags and place names with the Hungarian version and chanted aggressive anti-Romanian 
slogans. On 19 March 1990, the headquarters of established Romanian parties, such as the 
National Liberal Party, were under siege. The Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania 
(UDMR) was also attacked, a symbol of the disdain of the Hungarian minority towards 
compromise with the party in power. Finally, on 20 March 1990, street violence emerged. 
The aftermath of the events counted five casualties, 278 people injured; an Orthodox Church 
burned down and vandalized party headquarters. Petre Roman, the Romanian prime minister 
at the time, claimed “Hungarian nationalism had been revived in Transylvania by the actions 
of parties competing in the Hungarian general election which took place shortly after the 
Targu Mures events.”180 However, despite the initial concerns expressed, there were no 
further radical positions, as both Romania and Hungary were attempting to implement 
political pluralism. The Romanian newspaper Adevarul published an analysis in March 2010 
of the main causes for this conflict. One of the alternative assumptions was that these events 
were a result of the nationalist communism promoted by Ceausescu and the subsequent 
social and ethnic segregation.
181
 After these events, the Romanian government promoted a 
nationalist rhetoric about threats from minorities and unfriendly neighboring states, making 
Andrei Cornea describe them as manipulations of nationalism that led to “an enormous 
diversion destined…to indefinitely delay the democratization of Romanian society and the 
alternation of power.”182 In fact, nationalist symbolism from the pre-1945 era was heavily 
rehabilitated. The Iliescu regime began using historical commemorations that implied the 
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country‟s past greatness in the pre-communist period. During the 1990s, six to eight statues 
of the interwar dictator Marshal Antonescu were put up around Romania, and twenty-five 
streets and squares were named after him.
183
 These proofs of nationalism, along with a series 
of anti-opposition movements
184
 attracted a lot of concern from the international community. 
In the end, however, the international interest of the Romanian government had more 
influence on the subsequent minority policies. A revival of Ceausescu‟s anti-minority 
policies or an emulation of Slobodan Milosevic‟s ethnocentrism would have been lethal in an 
international context. In essence, the weak economy, the need for foreign support from a 
socio-political standpoint and domestic need for legitimization played a more important role 
in the relationship with minorities. In the end, Romania accepted that the governing principle 
would have to be “respect for the democratic principles and human rights established by the 
Helsinki Final Act and the [1991] Charter of Paris for a New Europe.”185 One of the most 
poignant political implications of these approaches was the allowance of the Hungarian 
minority to have a full role in state affairs. In post-communist Romanian elections held in 
May 1990, the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (UDMR) received over 7% of the 
national vote and became the largest opposition party in Romania.
186
  It is also without a 
doubt that Hungarians developed more freedom of expression than in the communist period. 
Analyst Tom Gallagher argues that, in fact, the “minority concerns figure more prominently 
on the NSF policy agenda earlier rather than later because Hungarians had organized 
themselves into a political body which soon showed that it was able to speak on the behalf of 
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a large section of the Hungarian population.”187 In essence, there was a need to hold control 
domestically without interfering with foreign interests. Nevertheless, Iliescu‟s attempts were 
weak: domestically, Romania was still fragile and the EU did not have enough power in a 
context in which ethnic nationalism, even though relatively subdued, clashed with attempts 
of foreign policy opening towards the West. In 1996, however, a new rightist government 
came to power offering Romania a new ray of hope. For Hungarians, this change was the 
most radical.  
 Iliescu‟s successor, Emil Constantinescu, emphasized the domestic concerns that 
would eventually hinder the post-communist transition period in Romania. This was yet 
another focus on fixing the internal problems caused by fifty years of communist rule and a 
government made of political “remnants” of that period. After the events in Targu Mures, the 
interethnic relations between Romanians and Hungarians were tenser than before and the 
government believed that there was a need for reconciliation.
188
 Consequently, UDMR joined 
the four-party coalition. Furthermore, a trade relationship flourished between Hungary and 
Romania. In his visit in March 1997, Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea emphasized the 
importance of economic cooperation, a switch from the Iliescu era when investment from 
Hungary was generally perceived as negative.
189
 The international interests of the Romanian 
government were starting to take shape, as the image of Romania abroad strongly improved.  
 In the 2000 election, Ion Iliescu came back to power, but the leftist parties, 
particularly the Social Democrats, also known as the reformed NSF, went through an intense 
period of modernization. In fact, Iliescu kept the policies focused on institutional European 
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integration in place. This conforms to post-communist theory that communist successor 
parties significantly change only once they use power in order to remain viable. Even if there 
could be a discussion about a success of the reforming of the Social Democrats after losing 
the elections in 1996, Iliescu became president after a second round against Corneliu Vadim 
Tudor, the leader of the Great Romania Party (PRM), a hypernationalist and highly 
xenophobic rightist party. The concerns among the population led to a clear victory for 
Iliescu in the second round. The relative success for the Great Romania Party was considered 
to be evidence of the still prevalent nationalism in Romania. However, I argue that in this 
case, popular nationalism played a small role. There were no serious negative social 
implications of the inclusion policies in the case of the Magyar population in this period of 
time. It could also be argued that it was simply a “protest” vote given to both Tudor and the 
rest of political class. Journalists Cas Mudde and Anna Siskova emphasized this 
disillusionment in their article The Romanian Scenario. They pointed out that CDR “had 
promised too much to too many people” but, despite its political discourse on Western-style 
democracy and openness towards the West, the coalition “soon turned governance into 
bickering over personal and financial details.”190 The population was disappointed in the 
performances of both central-left and central-right governments. But fundamentally, 
European integration became the ultimate goal for the population as well. A backward 
nationalist ideology would have not fitted the long-term socio-political plan of foreign 
policy, which was finally attained in 2007, when Romania officially entered the EU.  
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5.2 The European Union and Its Incentives 
 
 
 On the surface, the European Union seems very powerful. A number of scholars 
argue that, in essence, the power of norms is crucial in shaping state behavior.
191
  It is the 
first time when the external factor has used the term „conditionality‟ or „membership 
conditionality,‟ directly linking minority protection with EU membership. However, the 
greatest criticism comes from the fact that the criteria are extremely vague. Grabbe argues 
that the “uncertain linkage between fulfilling particular tasks and receiving particular 
benefits” may diffuse the EU‟s influence, leaving it unable to directly pressure.192  Moravcsik 
and Vachudova would go even further stating that the EU had created a set of standards on 
protection of ethnic minority rights that they had never set for themselves.
193
 This suggests 
that, as political scientist Melanie Ram notes, “Western efforts to prevent ethnic violence and 
to help build democracies throughout the region have indeed seen mixed results.”194  
 The EU‟s demands vis-à-vis minorities have not been precise or even strict in the case 
of Romania. This leads us to consider that the domestic government established its own 
minority policy management, focusing on the potential benefits that European integration 
could bring. I define the prospects offered by the EU as forms of soft forms of democracy 
promotion. Analyst Milada AnnaVachudova argues that “the greater the benefits of 
membership, the greater the potential political will to satisfy intrusive membership 
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requirements on the part of plausible future member states.”195  
 The failure to get Romania to pass a law on minorities in the early 1990s ultimately 
proves the early lack of power of the EU when it comes to involvement in internal use of 
minority policies. This is further supplemented by the fact that the EU depends on the 
willingness of the country to participate in the accession process.  
  In the early 1990s ethnic minorities in Romania demanded a national minority law. 
The involvement of the EU was relatively strong at first, as the Parliamentary Assembly 
wrote: “The Assembly proposes that the Romanian authorities and the Romanian Parliament: 
1. Adopt and implement as soon as possible, in keeping with the commitments they have 
made and with Assembly Recommendation 1201, legislation on national minorities and 
education.”196 Even if UDMR was quick to propose a draft law in December 1993, little 
happened on the issue after Romania joined the Council of Europe.
197
 Furthermore, in 
January 1995, when the government created a coalition with three nationalist parties, 
Romanian National Unity Party, the PRM, and the Socialist Workers‟ Party, the minority 
language law was not a priority and political scientist Judith Kelley argues that even the 
International Organizations “stemmed their efforts in realization of their futility.”198 The 
external interest on the status of ethnic minorities in Romania was clearly persistent, 
however, in the case of the Roma population. 
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 The Roma and their status in Romania has been a central point of concern for the 
European Union and other International Organizations. This can be considered a reactionary 
attitude to the growing number of the Roma population within Romania, particularly during 
the communist period: from 0.6% in 1956 to 2.4% in 2002.
199
 At the beginning of the 1990s 
the EU‟s attention to the Roma issue was relatively limited, mostly due to the fact that they 
were not perceived as a dangerous minority to security and stability within the European 
space. In essence, the relationship between the state and the Hungarian minority posed a 
greater threat due to the minority‟s territorial nature and ethnonationalist claims. Analyst 
Peter Vermeersch also notes the “growing coverage of the Roma‟s predicament by the 
international media and by international advocacy organizations such as Human Rights 
Watch, Amnesty International, the Project on Ethnic Relations, and the European Roma 
Rights Center.”200 The growing Roma population in Western Europe, as a consequence of 
Roma migration, also helped determine its status as a “minority problem.” Nevertheless, the 
marginalization of the Roma as approached by the international community should not be 
related to the policies settled by Romanian governments. The Roma have been politically and 
culturally less marginalized, but the social and economic exclusion has increased. In 
September 1993 the Transylvanian village of Hadareni was the scene of a serious attack upon 
the Roma: 750 ethnic Romanians and Hungarians killed four Roma, destroyed sixteen Roma 
dwellings and forced 130 to flee. The main criticism was that the reaction of the government 
was subdued, as it urged the Roma to simply move on. 
201
  But the concern is socially based 
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on interethnic clashes, national prejudice and discrimination.
202
 In 1991 Human Rights 
Watch published a report that discussed a series of concerns about the status of gypsy 
discrimination. There is a doubt however about how much discrimination is closely related to 
direct policies against Roma. The report discusses a campaign against black market dealers in 
order to keep prices under control and to prevent inflation. While the groups targeted were 
prominently part of the Romani population, the economic policies were generally framed in 
order to create an internal balance that Romania needed at the beginning of the transition 
period.
203
  Furthermore, the concept of democratic pluralism led to the decision not to 
obstruct the formation of Roma parties.
204
 Thus, the economic and political interests 
determined the policies vis-à-vis Roma as well. In this context, the concern of the 
international organizations has been mainly on the basic type of discrimination of the 
Romani population and the governmental reaction. 
  At the beginning of the 1990s Helsinki Watch emphasized that the government in 
Romania simply did not have any political will in dealing with racial violence that targeted 
the Roma population or in giving any type of protection.
205
 Amnesty International has 
published reports as well, in which discrimination of Romani has been the main topic of 
analysis when it comes to Romanian government policies towards minorities. They targeted 
local conflicts
206
 and even elements of concern within the media.
207
 As the debate around the 
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Roma population remains a central concern, its coordinates seem to be focused heavily on 
how social pressure works and how governments react. In the Romanian case, the policies 
have proved to be open since the beginning, due to a series of domestic and international 
interests. Despite the numerous alerts concerning discrimination and prejudice, these factors 
were not particularly defined at a policy level. In a Monitoring report from 2006, the EU 
noted:  
There are still cases of institutional violence against and assaulting of Roma, such as police raids and 
evictions in Roma communities, without providing them with alternative accommodation. Generally, 
the level of awareness of the Roma situation and of the government strategy for Roma, especially in 
the local communities, which are responsible for the evictions, is low. Local authorities should be 
supported to develop community development projects and bring solutions to the problems of legality 
of Roma settlements or others. The institutional framework for the implementation of the national 
strategy for Roma is not yet sufficiently effective and it tends to diminish the capacity decisionmaking 
capacity of the National Agency for Roma and representatives of the Roma population to participate 
effectively in decision-making in relevant areas. Romania's preparations in this area should be stepped 
up immediately and continued after accession.
208
  
 
 The immediacy to the 2007 accession would suggest that the EU pressure was at a 
very high level at the moment of the report. However, the Romanian Center for Ethnocultural 
Diversity mentioned in a later analysis that, in fact, the implementation of the EU 
requirements was relatively low when it comes to minorities.
209
 The weakness of the 
suggests, once again, that minority policies in Romania had a reactionary value to incentives 
and less on intense pressuring.  
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 The relationship between Romania and the European Community at the beginning of 
the transition period was fairly weak. The persistence of nationalism, the frail economy, and 
spread of corruption were a few critical issues for Romania. Furthermore, the issue of 
minority rights was not clearly defined within the European Community. In the mid 1990s 
the EU started addressing minority issues. Starting in 1996, when preparing the 1997 
Agenda, the EU began a framing of the expectations that the process of accession was to 
emphasize. The EU stated that certain ethnic minority legislation was a requirement for 
opening negotiations, but it did not dictate policy formulation. Accession was the incentive 
and the government modeled its policies based on level of interest, which in the Romanian 
case was very high.
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Conclusions 
 
 The relationship between Romanian state and its minorities has been largely analyzed 
throughout the years. With post-conflict nation building or European integration 
preoccupying current international politics of the region, there is a need to focus on the 
general picture of state construction and how governments managed or controlled their 
minorities. As the EU kept growing, finally accepting Romania and Bulgaria as members in 
2007, there has been a growing focus on how countries in the region have managed “by their 
own” and the “real” role of the international factors in the internal politics of these states. 
The emphasis on the economy and political dynamics has, however, hindered an important 
social aspect: the case of the ethnic minorities. Romania did not go through a civil war rooted 
in multi-ethnicity and most interests of the external actors, either states or organization, 
currently seem to be more and more focused on social discrimination vis-à-vis Romani 
population. However, Romania has had a long history when it comes to ethnic minorities. In 
this study, I focus on the approach of the state and the main impetuses that came into play in 
the drafting of the minority policies in the twentieth century.  
 In 1918 Romania went through a series of geographic changes, as Transylvania, 
Bessarabia and Bukovina were added to the Great Kingdom. This is the key moment in the 
relationship between the state and its minorities, mostly because these regions had a number 
of ethnicities (Hungarians, Ukrainians, Germans, Russian-Bessarabians) that led to a 
commitment of nation strengthening. This was the main impetus behind these policies of the 
time, the focus largely being on education and citizenship. Also, the government needed 
more control and internal legitimacy. But if these factors led to policies of attempted 
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assimilation of a large sector of the minority population, grassroots Romanian anti-Semitism 
of the nineteenth century also developed extensively in the interwar period. Dreams of 
homogeneity led to a segregation of the Jewish population. The process of nation building 
largely shadowed the role of the international community of the time. Despite the existence 
of a relatively enthusiastic League of Nations, its role was minimal and largely purely 
theoretic in its Minority Treaties.  
 It is without doubt that during the interwar period the focus on population 
homogeneity led to political and social xenophobia. There was a remarkable rise of the 
extreme right. This was not a singular case, but part of an extensive trend in Europe, seen in 
the rise of Hitler of Mussolini. King Carol II was influenced to a large extent by the 
personalities of the fascist leaders, but less by the foreign policy of these countries in relation 
to Romania. Nevertheless, Romania tended to associate its foreign policy more and more 
with Germany. However, Carol‟s personal political interests seemed to have trumped 
arguments that highlight direct external involvement in domestic policy. In fact, the need of 
power for the King led to a series of erratic decisions vis-à-vis minorities. On one hand there 
was a massive trend of acceptance and integration, as seen in the case of Hungarians, 
Germans or Ukrainians, but the Jews were victims of the growing interwar anti-Semitism. 
Carol, however, did not lead a definite “crusade” against Jews. His successor Ion Antonescu, 
however, was the leader of the great anti-Semitic movement in Romania.  
 General Ion Antonescu, a controversial figure in Romanian history helped orchestrate 
the Romanian Holocaust, particularly between 1938 and 1944. His alliances with Nazi 
Germany and friendship with Hilter led to a focus on the pro-Germany foreign policy of 
Romania. However, the Romanian government‟s and Antonescu‟s xenophobic policies 
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against the Jews and the Roma were largely influenced by hypernationalism and ideals of a 
homogeneous Romania, and only as reactions to the international context of the time. 
Antonescu‟s racial state was not born suddenly. In essence, the Marshal‟s hypernationalism 
stemmed from a previously discriminatory state. The internal focus of his policies can be 
clearly seen in his decision to save a great number of Jews from being deported to Poland. 
The dichotomy between his decisions concerning the Jewish and Romani populations led to a 
series of controversies around his politics, heavily exploited by subsequent regimes.  
 The communist period in Romania developed in a peculiar manner. Once again, the 
state reacted to external factors, particularly the influence of the leaders in Moscow. But 
when it comes to minorities the domestic interests outplayed the potential pressure from 
Moscow. The initial need for political legitimacy made the communist political leaders draft 
policies in order to gain supporters of the regime. The Hungarian population, for example, 
was represented politically and received an autonomous regime. Things changed in 1956 due 
to the Hungarian Revolution, a matter of concern for the Romanian communists. A series of 
restrictions followed for the Hungarian population, suggesting that the domestic political 
interests mattered immensely for the Romanian leaders. The switch from liberal to restrictive 
policies points to an internal need to centralize power and have a wide control over the 
population. Nicolae Ceausescu supported a new set of liberal policies concerning minorities. 
But this halted in 1971, when he started building a nationalist communist state. His minority 
policies mirrored the interwar period, when the government supported aggressive 
assimilation. Ceausescu wanted to overcentralize power and homogeneity of the state was an 
important element of interest. This is also a period of migration of German and Jewish 
populations, supported by Ceausescu. The economic interests of the state had a great 
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influence, especially if one considers that for every person that left for Germany, the state 
would receive hard currency. In essence, Ceausescu‟s policies of assimilation and non-
aggressive homogenization based on allowance of migration created a favorable context for 
the manifestation of the national ideology under communism.  
 When communism fell in 1989, the government was left with a shattered country 
from a socio-political and economic point of view. The immediate enthusiasm led to a 
sudden revival of liberal policies towards minorities. However, the initial government was 
mostly made of reformed communists, an aspect that hindered, according to some political 
scientists, interests of accession in the EU. Hence, the influence of the EU at the beginning of 
the decade was relatively minimal. Romania was still a nationalist state to a great extent. 
Nevertheless, the potential accession to the EU offered strong incentives, largely emphasized 
by the elected government of 1996. In essence, the potential support of economic and 
political development led to an important change of approach by the post-communist 
governments. This can be clearly seen in the socio-political rights offered to minorities. 
Despite an international focus on recurrent discrimination vis-à-vis the Roma population in 
Romania, the reports of the international community did not play a crucial role. The 
governments did not draft any anti-Roma policies specifically. The discrimination seems to 
have social motivation only. Even more, these extensive reports on discrimination do not 
seem to have had any heavy implications in the accession to the EU. The lack of clear focus 
on the meritocratic accession on the issue of minorities, leads to a strong debate between 
scholars about the true role of the EU in the relationship between states and minorities. In the 
Romanian case, the EU‟s role was not decisive or singular, the impetus coming, once again, 
from within.  
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 The main conclusion that can be drawn from this study is the fact that throughout the 
twentieth century, the internal needs and interests of the governments, such as domestic 
legitimization, socio-economic and political domestic interests, have heavily determined 
minority politics. Whether or not the Romanian governments succeeded in their aims to 
assimilated, segregate or integrate minorities, it is without doubt that they had great control in 
dealing with Romanian multi-ethnic society. It is also noticeable that the importance of 
minorities in Romania has decreased systematically. At this stage, it seems that Romania has 
stagnated when it comes to managing its minorities. International NGOs and human rights 
groups have maintained their focus on the discrimination of the Romani population. 
However, the EU does not seem to have any considerable influence on the matter. When it 
comes to the Hungarian group, they have been part of the political spectrum in the last 
twenty years and have played a big role in the last eight years.
211
 The main cause for their 
inclusion was a series of political interests, which involved the need for a majority vote in the 
Parliament. Hence, an alliance with the Hungarian party has proved to be successful. 
Ultimately, it seems that the pattern of the focus on the internal impetuses has been kept 
since the accession in the EU. It is difficult to predict whether the EU would pressure 
Romania in a case of extreme measures against minorities, such as the expulsion of a specific 
ethnic group.
212
  But in the end, looking at the post-1918 history of the relationship between 
state and minorities, Romanian governments seem to play by their own rules. At this stage, 
an extreme action against any minority group would simply not be useful or relevant. 
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 In the 2004 elections the UDMR became part of the governing coalition. UDMR President Marko Bela was 
elected Deputy Prime Minister responsible for Education, Cultural and European Integration. 
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 In the light of the 2010 expulsions of the Roma population in France, the EU has had a very aggressive 
reaction. EU chief Viviane Reding called the deportations a “disgrace” and called for immediate action against 
the French government. Ian Traynor, “Roma deportations by France a disgrace says EU.” The Guardian, 14 
September 2010. 
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